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STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
NORTH AMERICA LOCAL 17,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6274
TOWN OF LUMBERLAND,
Employer.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Laborers International Union of North 
America Local 17 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances.
Included: Any and all full-time and part-time employees of the Town Highway
Department, including but not limited to the following titles: Motor 
Equipment Operator (MEO), Working Supervisor, Mechanic, and 
Laborer.
Excluded: Highway Superintendent.
Certification - C-6274 -2
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the Laborers International Union of North America Local 17.
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: December 29, 2014 
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6276
TOWN OF FRANKFORT,
Employer.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances.
Included: Working Foreman, Heavy Equipment Operator and Mechanic.
Excluded: All other employees.
Certification - C-6276 -2
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation -to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession.
DATED: December 29, 2014
Albany, New York
V
(2
Sheila S. dole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED TEACHERS OF SEAFORD, NYSUT, AFT, 
NEA, AFL-CIO,
Charging Party,
-and-
SEAFORD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent,
-and-
SEAFORD ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION,
Intervenor.
CASE NO. U-31184
PATRICK J. TERKOSKI, LRS, for Charging Party
INGERMAN SMITH (CHRISTOPHER VENATOR of counsel), for Respondent 
MICHAEL A. STARVAGGI, ESQ., for Intervenor
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Seaford Union Free School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1 The ALJ held that 
the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when, in July 2011, it unilaterally transferred duties that had been exclusively performed 
by department chairpersons at the District’s high school represented by the United 
Teachers of Seaford, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO, (UTS) to nonunit administrators 1
1 46 PERB 4566 (2013).
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represented by the Seaford Administrators Association (SAA).
The ALJ’s decision was grounded on an exhaustive account of the duties 
performed by the department chairpersons at the District’s high school based on 
unrefuted documentary and testimonial evidence. She held that those duties were 
exclusively performed by the chairpersons, as each of the UTS’s witnesses testified, 
notwithstanding largely unrefuted documentary and testimonial evidence that the District 
adduced to show that those duties were shared by the nonunit administrators.
According to the ALJ, however, the administrators’ duties were directed to building-wide 
or District-wide operations, while the duties performed by the department chairpersons 
focused on departmental operations. Accordingly, she held that the duties performed 
by the administrators did not defeat the UTS’s claim of exclusivity over the departmental 
work.
She also distinguished the work of department chairpersons at the District’s high 
school from similar tasks that were not exclusively performed by department 
chairpersons at the District’s elementary and middle schools, emphasizing the different 
nature and complexity of the work at the high school as compared to the work 
performed for the District’s lower schools. Therefore, the ALJ held that the UTS’s lack 
of exclusivity over the work at the lower schools did not defeat its claim of exclusivity 
over the departmental work at the high school.
Finally, there being no dispute that the District unilaterally transferred the work of 
department chairpersons at the high school to nonunit administrators for economic 
reasons, the ALJ held that the District violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act and she directed
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the District to undertake certain remedial measures. However, the ALJ dismissed the 
UTS’s charge insofar as it alleged that the District violated the Act by transferring the 
work of department chairpersons at the lower schools to nonunit personnel.
EXCEPTIONS
The District does not dispute the ALJ’s 21 page account of the duties performed 
by the department chairpersons at the high school. Rather, the District’s exceptions 
allege, inter alia, that the ALJ erred in concluding that the work performed by 
department chairpersons at the high school was exclusively performed by them. It 
argues that nonunit administrators have performed substantially similar work, thereby 
defeating the UTS’s claim of exclusivity. It also argues that the ALJ erred in 
distinguishing the non-exclusive work at the District’s lower schools from the work 
performed by department chairpersons at the high school. It argues that the non­
exclusive work at the District’s lower schools defeats the UTS’s claim of exclusivity over 
the work at the high school. Finally, the District argues that the work of department 
chairpersons is not a “core component” of the overall administrative tasks performed by 
nonunit administrators in which the department chairpersons play an allegedly 
“incidental” role. In effect, it argues that the core components of the department 
chairpersons’ work are performed by nonunit administrators.2
The UTS filed a response to the District’s exceptions supporting the ALJ’s
2 The District also alleges that the ALJ erred by declining to follow another ALJ’s 
decision in Riverhead Cent. Sch Dist, 41 PERB 4576 (2008). Although the ALJ was 
not required to follow Riverhead, she distinguished the facts in that case from the 
instant facts. In any event, we are not bound by the ALJ’s decision in Riverhead, and 
we express no opinion regarding its merits.
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conclusion that the District violated the Act by transferring the chairpersons’ work at the 
high school to nonunit personnel. It took no exceptions to the ALJ’s dismissal of its 
charge concerning the transfer of the chairpersons’ tasks at the elementary and middle 
schools. SAA filed neither exceptions nor a response.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and adopt her 
recommended remedial order.
FACTS
Because the District does not contest the ALJ’s account of the department 
chairpersons’ duties, we do not reiterate them here. Indeed, we have carefully reviewed 
the record and compared it to the ALJ’s account of those duties and find that her 
account is thorough and accurate. Accordingly, we recite the duties described by the 
ALJ only briefly and insofar as they are necessary for us to address the District’s claim 
that nonunit administrators performed substantially similar duties, thereby defeating the 
UTS’s claim of exclusivity over the work.
The UTS represents a collective bargaining unit that includes teachers and 
department chairpersons. SAA represents a unit of principals, assistant principals and 
directors. The District’s superintendent and assistant superintendents are 
unrepresented.
The District operates two elementary schools, one middle school, and one high 
school. It has employed department chairpersons for more than fifteen years. Each 
has responsibilities over his or her own department. In order to enable them to perform 
their departmental tasks, the District reduced their teaching load from five to four
-5-
classes per day and relieved them of their daily duty periods. Moreover, the District 
paid them a contractually negotiated stipend above their normal teaching salary for their 
work as department chairpersons.
During the 2010-2011 school year, the District employed fifteen chairpersons 
who were assigned to the following departments: mathematics, science, social studies, 
English, reading, technology/family/consumer science, art, foreign language and 
English as a second language (ESL), music, library, business and computers, sixth 
grade, special education, physical and health education, and high school guidance.
At the end of the.2010-2011 school year, the District decided, for budgetary 
reasons, to eliminate twelve of the fifteen chairperson positions for the 2011-2012 
school year. It retained department chairpersons to supervise only the departments of 
special education, physical and health education, and high school guidance. In 
September 2011, those who no longer served as department chairpersons resumed 
their full-time teaching duties and lost their stipend for serving as chairpersons. All of 
their chairperson tasks were assigned to District principals, assistant principals, and 
other administrators. There is no dispute that the District unilaterally transferred the 
work to the nonunit employees.
In addition to documentary evidence, the record consists of the testimony of five 
witnesses. The UTS called as its witnesses three teachers who, until June 2011, 
worked as department chairpersons; Donna Manning, the Art Department chairperson 
from 1995 to June 2011, Linda Schwartz, the English Department chairperson from 
2008 to July 2011, and Sonia Zervakos, the Foreign Language and ESL chairperson
Case No.U-31184
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from 2007 to 2011. The District called Brian Conboy, who became the superintendent 
of schools on August 1, 2010 and who served as the assistant superintendent for 
curriculum, instruction and personnel (ASCIP) from July 2004 until July 2010. The SAA 
called as its witness Michael Ragon, the District’s high school principal since 2001.
The job description for the position of chairperson sets forth four primary areas of 
responsibility: curriculum, budget, personnel, and departmental organization. The job 
description also contains numerous subcategories of duties for each of the main areas 
of responsibility.
Department chairpersons conducted monthly meetings with teachers in their 
departments in association with their responsibility to oversee pedagogical operations 
within their departments. During these meetings, the chairpersons and teachers 
deliberated upon and developed plans and recommendations concerning the selection 
and purchase of supplies within budgeted allocations, requests for professional 
development activities, plans for field trips, and the selection of textbooks. They also 
wrote course descriptions, scheduled teachers for classes, developed curricula, 
prepared departmental budgets, and selected from the first-round pool of candidates for 
teaching positions within their departments.
Where the department chairpersons’ decisions affected building-wide operations, 
such as the creation of master schedules for classes and scheduling field trips, their 
plans and recommendations were subject to approval by the building principal or - 
assistant principals. Where their decisions and recommendations affected District-wide 
\  operations, such as their budgets, selections from the initial pool of teacher candidates
J
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to be hired by the District, and the addition or deletion of courses and alterations in 
curricula, their recommendations were subject to approval by the building principal and 
then higher level administrators and, ultimately, by the board of education. There is no 
evidence that nonunit principals or other administrators engage in similar departmental 
meetings at which departmental plans are discussed, developed, determined or 
recommended.
In contrast to the departmental oversight provided by the department 
chairpersons, Brian Conboy, the superintendent of schools since August 2010, testified 
regarding the building-wide and district-wide responsibilities of principals and higher 
level administrators. He illustrated such activities as the initiation of a full day 
kindergarten, the rearranging of the high school science program, the development of a 
special education curriculum that continues throughout a student’s progression in 
school, and an Academic Intervention Service Plan that helps students in need of 
assistance. He also testified that department chairpersons meet on a regular basis with 
District administrators to discuss district-wide concerns and educational matters that he 
characterized as “global.” Thus, for example, at such meetings he would distribute . 
literature concerning trends in education that he obtains from various educational 
associations in which he is a member. Other matters presented at these meetings 
include changes in state mandated programs and regulatory issues.
The record contains very little evidence regarding the responsibilities of 
department chairpersons at the elementary and middle school levels. It does, however, 
as the ALJ found, indicate that building principals and assistant principals had a greater
Case No. U-31184 -8-
involvement in departmental decisions at those levels than at the high school. Indeed, 
Conboy distinguished the work of department chairpersons at the high school by 
describing the work there as more complex, requiring greater oversight by the 
department chairpersons, who work at the high school.
DISCUSSION
First, we reject the District’s argument that it was permitted to unilaterally transfer 
the department chairpersons’ tasks to nonunit administrators because that work was 
“incidental” to the “core components” of the administrators’ final decision making 
process.3 In Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist (hereafter, “Manhassef ),4 as expressly 
confirmed by the Appellate Division, we abandoned the “core components” analysis in 
assessing the negotiability of the transfer of bargaining unit work to nonunit personnel. 
There, applying a past practice analysis, we held that the unilateral transfer of exclusive 
bargaining unit work to nonunit personnel -  even incidental tasks -  violated the Act. 
Therefore, the District’s reliance on the “core components” analysis is unavailing.
Second, we find that the ALJ properly distinguished the work performed by 
nonunit principals and other administrators at the District’s elementary and middle 
schools from that performed by department chairpersons at the high school. Under
3 The District relies on County of Westchester, 31 PERB fflf 3034 and 3035 (1997). See 
also, City of Rome, 32 PERB If 3058 (1999).
4 41 PERB If 3005 (2008) confd sub nom. Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York 
State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231,42 PERB If 7004 (3d Dept 2009), on 
remitter, 42 PERB If 3016 (2009). There, we expressly reversed County of 
Westchester, supra. Indeed, under Manhasset, the “incidental” performance of 
exclusive bargaining unit work by nonunit personnel does not necessarily defeat a claim 
of exclusivity over the work.
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Manhasset, when discernible boundaries are defined by past practices, they are 
revealed in the nature of the workxperformed, its frequency, its geographic location, the 
employer’s explicit or implicit rationale for the practice, and other factors that establish 
that the at-issue work was treated differently from similar work performed by nonunit 
personnel. As with other practices, a practice establishing a discernible boundary will 
be found where “the practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a 
period of time under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the 
affected unit employees that the [practice] would continue.”5
Here, although the record is scant regarding the duties of department 
chairpersons at the District’s lower schools, Conboy’s testimony shows that, for its own 
reasons, the District determined that it was appropriate to assign the department 
chairpersons’ tasks at the lower schools to nonunit employees, notwithstanding that it 
was paying department chairpersons to do the work. Conboy’s testimony indicates that 
the distinction was a function of the more complex tasks that were required of 
department chairpersons at the high school, where the department chairpersons work. 
Therefore, we find that the ALJ correctly concluded that there was a District-created 
discernible boundary that distinguished the work of department chairpersons at the high 
school from similar work performed by nonunit administrators at the lower schools. 
Indeed, the simple location of the work is sufficient to establish a discernible boundary.6
5 County of Nassau, 24 PERB 3029 at 3058 (1991).
6 See e.g., City of Rochester, 21 PERB 3040 (1988), confd sub nom. City of Rochester 
v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 155 AD2d 1003 (4th Dept 1989).
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Finally, we agree with the ALJ’s conclusion that the work of department 
chairpersons at the District’s high school was exclusive bargaining unit work.
The record shows that the District has created a layered system of making 
various operational decisions. For example, department chairpersons prepare 
departmental budgets in consultation with departmental teachers. Each departmental 
budget is submitted to the high school principal who reviews, compiles, and approves or 
modifies them as necessary. The consolidated high school budget is then submitted to 
higher level administrators along with the budgets for the other schools for further 
review, approval, and modifications for submission to the District’s board of education. 
Contrary to the District’s argument, the layers of review, modifications, and approvals do 
not diminish the department chairpersons’ role in creating the preliminary departmental 
budgets or defeat the UTS’s claim of exclusivity over that work.
Similar layering governs the department chairpersons’ decisions regarding 
pedagogical issues such as the creation or deletion of classes and curricula, the 
selection of textbooks, approval of field trips, and scheduling classes and exams. As 
with the development of departmental budgets, that the department chairpersons’ 
decisions are subject to review and approval by higher level administrators does not 
diminish or defeat the UTS’s claim of exclusivity over the tasks associated with making 
the preliminary departmental decisions and recommendations. Likewise, department 
chairpersons have exclusively performed the preliminary review of candidates to be 
hired by the District as teachers, and they provided recommendations for those whom 
they deem fit to higher level administrators for further consideration.
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There is no evidence that nonunit administrators have had any material role in 
the departmental deliberations by which departmental decisions and recommendations 
are developed. While Conboy’s testimony on which the District relies shows that 
nonunit administrators had a role in making departmental decisions at the District’s 
lower schools, that testimony does not reveal a similar role in departmental 
deliberations at the high school. In that regard, we agree with the ALJ’s conclusion that 
Ragon’s generalized testimony regarding his involvement in curriculum development 
and other pedagogical matters at the high school does not establish that those duties 
supplanted the preliminary decisions made by department chairpersons such as to 
defeat the UTS’s claim Of exclusivity over that work.
We conclude that, when read as a whole, the record shows that department 
chairpersons exclusively performed the preliminary stages of the District’s layered 
administrative processes, while higher level administrators performed further review and 
adoption of the at-issue administrative decisions. The chairpersons’ tasks were 
assigned as a discrete departmental function apart from the review and oversight 
provided by the nonunit administrators. Indeed, the District itself created the position, 
assigned the departmental work, facilitated its performance by reducing the teachers’ 
work load, and paid the unit employees a separately negotiated wage to perform the 
duties. Simply put, the District created the discernible boundary that distinguishes the 
chairpersons’ departmental tasks from the building-wide and District-wide final 
decision-making process.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s conclusion that the District violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the
Case No. U-31184 -12-
Act by unilaterally transferring the department chairpersons’ work at the District’s high 
school to nonunit administrators, and we adopt her recommended remedial order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District:
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit personnel the 
academic department work previously performed exclusively by chairpersons;
2. Restore the work previously performed exclusively by chairpersons to 
employees in the unit represented by the UTS;
3. Make whole all unit employees affected by the transfer of academic 
department work previously performed exclusively by chairpersons for any 
loss of wages, including overtime pay and benefits, suffered by reason of the 
transfer of unit work, with interest at the maximum legal rate; and
4. Sign and post the attached notice to employees at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to communicate with unit employees.
DATED: December 29, 2014 
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
We hereby notify all employees of the Seaford Union Free School (District) in the unit 
represented by the United Teachers of Seaford, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO (UTS) 
that the District will:
1. Not unilaterally transfer to nonunit personnel the academic department work 
previously performed exclusively by chairpersons;
2. Restore the work previously performed exclusively by chairpersons to 
employees in the unit represented by the UTS; and
3. Make whole all unit employees affected by the transfer of academic department 
work previously performed exclusively by chairpersons for any loss of wages, 
including overtime pay and benefits, suffered by reason of the transfer of unit work, 
with interest at the maximum legal rate.
Dated By
(Representative)
SEAFORD UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT
This. Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Charging Party,
-and-
CASE NO. U-30815
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION),
Respondent.
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, GENERAL COUNSELS
(MIGUEL G. ORTIZ of counsel), for Charging Party
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (CLAY J.
LODOVICE of counsel), for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in an improper practice proceeding.1 The ALJ held that 
the State of New York (Department of Environmental Conservation) (DEC or State) did 
not violate §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when, 
effective January 1,2011, DEC unilaterally eliminated 42 full-time permanent CSEA- 
represented positions at Belleayre Ski Center and then re-hired many of the laid off 
employees as part-time “long term seasonal employees,” also represented by CSEA, 
despite a concomitant reduction in their hours of work and a loss of benefits. *
46 PERB If 4592 (2013).1
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EXCEPTIONS
CSEA’s exceptions allege that the ALJ erred in concluding that the State was 
permitted to unilaterally “convert” the 42 full-time positions into “long term seasonal” 
positions with fewer work hours andbenefits, absent evidence of a corresponding 
reduction in the level of services provided by the at-issue employees.
The State filed a response supporting the ALJ’s decision.
As discussed herein, we affirm the decision of the ALJ.
FACTS
Belleayre Ski Center is a recreational facility run by DEC. Until January 2011, it 
was staffed by 56 full-time permanent employees and a pool of part-time employees 
(called “seasonal employees”). While the permanent full-time employees work year 
round, the part-time seasonals work up to 1,750 hours per year (80% of the full-time 
employees’ annual hours). Some seasonals work only during the winter ski season, 
others work during the summer season, some both seasons, and still others work the full 
permissible 1,750 hours. Although the number of seasonal employees on duty during 
the year varies widely depending on the season, in fiscal year 2007-2008 Belleayre 
employed an average of 141.5 seasonal employees per pay period. In fiscal year 2008- 
2009, it employed an average of 97.7 seasonal employees per pay period. In fiscal year 
2009-2010 DEC employed an average of 112.3 per pay period, and in fiscal year 2010- 
2011 the average number of seasonals per pay period was 114.3.
In the autumn of 2010, the State instituted a formal reduction in force. DEC was 
directed to eliminate 140 permanent positions. According to DEC Director of 
Management and Budget Services Nancy Lussier, the agency decided that the 140 cuts 
had to be based on function or task because DEC had experienced a number of
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“random” job losses due to employee-driven decisions such as early retirement. 
Accordingly, DEC decided to reduce its full-time work force at Belleayre by 43 positions, 
of which 42 were represented by CSEA. The decision to eliminate the 43 positions at 
Belleayre was based on two factors: Belleayre was not a primary element of DEC’S core 
mission of protecting environmental quality and natural resources, and cutting permanent 
items at Belleayre would still allow the ski center to remain open while allowing 
employees to remain employed, albeit in seasonal positions.
The layoffs were effective on December 31,2010 and left Belleayre with a full­
time staff of 13. While many of the laid off employees “bumped” into or took positions at 
other State sites or retired, DEC offered the laid off employees the opportunity to take 
existing open seasonal positions at Belleayre in order to minimize the impact of the lay­
offs on the affected employees and to maintain experienced staff.
Some of the former full-time employees who accepted DEC’S offer of re­
employment as seasonals were hired under the same titles they previously held on a 
permanent basis, others were given the title Park Recreation Aide. All of the seasonal 
titles given to the previously permanent employees were in existence as seasonal titles 
prior to the reduction in force. Due to the reduction in the hours of work, the pay rates for 
the seasonal positions were generally lower than those of the permanent positions.
As accurately found by the ALJ, the total number of seasonal employees at 
Belleayre did not significantly increase as a result of offering seasonal positions to 
formerly permanent employees. In fiscal year 2011-2012, following the reduction in 
force, the year in issue here, the average number of employees per pay period was 
125.5 -  11.2 more than the average number of seasonal employees per pay period 
during the previous year (114.3), when there was a full complement of 56 full-time
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employees. Put another way, the full work force at Belleayre during fiscal year 2010- 
2011 was an average per pay period of 170.3 (56 full-time plus 114.3 seasonals), while 
the average work force per pay period during 2011-2012 was 138.5 (13 full-time plus 
125.5 seasonals), showing a total average reduction of 31.2 employees per pay period 
following the December 2010 elimination of 42 full-time CSEA represented employees.
Effective March 30, 2012, at the close of the State’s 2011-2012 fiscal year, 
Belleayre ceased to be a unit of state government. Pursuant to Ch. 60, Part C of the laws 
of 2012, Belleayre was transferred to the New York State Olympic Regional 
Development Authority. See, generally, Public Authorities Law, Title 28, § 2600, et seq.
DISCUSSION
A public employer’s decision to reduce its workforce through layoffs is not a 
mandatory subject for negotiations,2 even where the decision is motivated by fiscal 
considerations.3 As a rule, the wisdom of an employment-related decision does not 
affect the negotiability of the subject.4 Thus, the State had no duty to negotiate with 
CSEA concerning its decision to layoff 42 CSEA represented permanent full-time 
employees at Belleayre Ski Center, although the impact of such a decision might be 
mandatorily negotiable.5
2 See, City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB 3060 (1971).
3 See, e.g., Burnt Hills - Ballston Lake Central School District, 25 PERB U 3066 (1992).
4 See, e.g., See, e.g., City of Poughkeepsie, 15 PERB 3045 (1982), confd sub nom. 
City of Poughkeepsie v Newman, 95 AD2d 101, 16 PERB ^ 7021 (3d Dep't 1983), 
appeal dismissed, 60 N.Y.2d 859, 16 PERB H 7027 (1983), Iv denied 62 NY2d 602
(1984); State of New York (Department of Transportation), 27 PERB If 3056 (1994).
5 See, City of New Rochelle, supra note 2. Indeed, an appropriate impact demand might 
have included a hiring preference for the existing CSEA-represented seasonal positions.
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Moreover, on this record, the State had no bargaining obligation with CSEA 
concerning the assignment of the work previously performed by the full-time permanent 
CSEA represented employees to its existing pool of CSEA represented seasonal 
positions. Because the seasonals are in CSEA’s bargaining unit, there was no transfer 
of unit work to nonunit personnel.6 And, because the charge does not allege that such 
assignments concerned work that is not inherently within the sphere of duties properly 
performed by the seasonals, no violation can be found by that assignment.7 Finally, 
there is no allegation that the workload of the seasonal employees has increased in any 
material way. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the State violated the Act by increasing 
the workload of the seasonals.8
Therefore, on this record, the State did not violate the Act by simply eliminating 
the full-time positions and assigning that work to its existing pool of seasonal employees. 
CSEA argues, however, that the State violated the Act because it offered the part-time 
seasonal positions to the former full-time employees.
Characterizing the State’s conduct as the “conversion” of existing full-time 
positions into new part-time seasonal positions, CSEA argues that the State violated the 
Act, absent evidence that there was a corresponding reduction in the level of services; 
i.e., a reduction in the overall work performed. In support, CSEA relies on our decisions
6 Compare, Manhasset union Free Sch Dist., 41 PERB ^ 3005 (2008) confd sub nom. 
Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 
1231,42 PERB 7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remand, 42 PERB 3016 (2009).
7 Compare, City of Rochester, 17 PERB 3082 (1984).
8 Compare New Rochelle Housing Auth, 2I PERB 3054 (1988).
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in County of Broome9 and County of Erie.10 1
In Broome, the employer unilaterally eliminated existing full-time positions and
replaced each with two new part-time positions that, together, worked the same number
of hours as the full-time positions and performed the same duties. The Board held:
[Although the County may have the right to curtail service 
and to layoff employees, and to make a determination to 
create part-time positions, it does not follow that it has the 
right to merely substitute part-time employees for full-time 
employees where there is no change in the level or nature of 
services being provided. It is this substitution which is 
challenged by CSEA and which we find constitutes a 
mandatory subject of bargaining (emphasis added).11
Because there was no evidence of a reduction in services in that case, the Board held
that the employer’s conduct violated the Act.
In Erie, an employer eliminated existing vacant 40-hour full-time positions and
hired new 39-hour part-time employees to perform the same work. As in Broome, there
was no evidence of a reduction in services, but the newly created positions earned
significantly less negotiated wages and benefits. The Board observed:
[T]he County is reducing the number of hours and benefits of 
unit employees by converting full-time positions to 39-hour 
[part-time] positions without it presenting any evidence of a 
specific determination that the same level of services can be 
completed in fewer hours or evidence that the County made 
a good faith reduction in services.12
The Board concluded that the employer’s conduct amounted to a reduction in the hours
9 22 PERB If 3019 (1989).
10 43 PERB If 3016 (2010), confd sub nom. County of Erie v New York State Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 81 AD3d 1313, 44 PERB 7002 (4tfl Dept 2011).
11 Broome, supra, note 10 at p. 3052.
12 Erie, supra, note 11, 43 PERB U 3016 (2010), at p. 3063.
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of work of the former full-time positions that violated the Act, because “hours” is a 
mandatorily negotiable term and condition of employment under § 201.4.
Here, CSEA argues that the State failed to establish that its action resulted in a 
reduction in the level of services, as in Broome and Erie.
However, CSEA’s argument is grounded on an incorrect premise; i.e., the State 
reduced the hours of work of the full-time permanent employees by “converting” their 
existing positions into new part-time seasonal positions. As the ALJ correctly held, the 
State reduced its workforce of full-time permanent employees and assigned their duties 
to its existing pool of part-time seasonal positions. It did not replace existing full-time 
positions with new part-time positions. That the State offered vacant existing seasonal 
positions to the laid off full-time employees does not show that it “converted” existing full­
time positions into new part-time positions, as was the case in Broome and Erie.
The flaw in CSEA’s argument is that in Broome and Erie, existing identifiable full­
time positions were replaced by new equally identifiable part-time positions. In other 
words, the record in each case established a direct relationship between the eliminated 
and new positions. Here, CSEA attempts to show that relationship by emphasizing the 
identity of the persons holding the seasonal positions., It contends that the necessary 
conversion is shown by the fact that many of the same employees who now hold the 
seasonal positions formerly held the eliminated full-time positions. However, the identity 
of the employees simply means that they accepted the State’s offer of employment 
within the existing pool of seasonals. It does not establish that the State converted 
existing full-time positions into new part-time positions, as was the case in Broome and
Case No. U-30815 - 8 -
Erie. 13
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed, CSEA’s exceptions are denied, and
the charge is hereby dismissed.
DATED: December 29, 2014 
Albany, New York
//Jerome Lef kowit z, Chairperson
/,
V
Sheila S. Cole; Member
13 Absent evidence of a direct substitution or conversion of existing full-time positions into 
new part-time positions, it is immaterial whether the State reduced its level of services in 
association with its nonmandatory reduction in its full-time work force or its permissible 
assignment of the duties to existing CSEA represented part-time seasonal positions.
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an administrative law 
judge, finding that the Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU) violated § 209-a.2(a) 
of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when, pursuant to an internal 
membership rule, it altered Charles Asamoah’s seniority standing for the nonpayment of 
dues.1 The ALJ dismissed the remainder of the charge.
7 EXCEPTIONS
The TWU excepts to the ALJ’s finding that the TWU violated the Act by enacting 
an internal union rule altering the seniority of members in arrears in their dues, on the 1
1 47 PERB If 4508 (2014).
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grounds that we lack jurisdiction over internal union matters, and that the imposition of 
such a rule constitutes a perse violation of the Act, even in the absence of harm to the 
penalized member. The TWU further excepts to the ALJ’s order directing the TWU to 
restore Asamoah to his proper placement on the seniority list, to not alter his seniority 
ranking for failure to pay union dues, and to post the ordered notice.
No response was filed to the exceptions. .
FACTS
The relevant facts are stated in the ALJ’s decision, and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions before us. Asamoah has been an employee of 
The Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MaBSTOA) since 1991, 
and works at the Zerega facility in the Bronx as a chassis maintainer on the 2 p.m. to 
the 10 p.m. shift (mid-shift). It is undisputed that overtime work is identified by 
management and assigned by TWU vice chairperson Scott Steinberg, based upon 
seniority as recorded in a roster maintained by the TWU. Steinberg testified that, 
according to the TWU’s rules, an employee whose dues payment is in arrears is 
considered to be “not a member in good standing,” and, as such, is placed at the bottom 
of the seniority list for the purposes of being offered overtime and having vacation 
requests considered.2 Asamoah and co-worker Steven Franciosi testified that a 
member not in good standing would not be afforded any overtime.
Steinberg testified that he distributes overtime after receiving a list of 
management’s overtime needs and comparing that list to the TWU’s list of employees, 
ordered by seniority, who are next to.be offered the work with the nature of the work to 
be done and employee qualifications. Steinberg also refers to a list of employees who
2 Transcript, at pp. 301-302, 321-322; 305-306.
Case No. U-31327 -3-
have indicated an interest in overtime assignments, which is posted outside the TWU 
office at the facility each Thursday. The names of eligible employees are called over 
the loud speaker twice before Steinberg moves to the next name on the list. Employees 
who do not respond when called are “charged,” that is treated as if they worked the 
overtime, so their names go to the bottom of the list. Employees are not charged if the 
employee was not called as not qualified for the assignment, is on leave or the 
assignment is scheduled prior to the employee’s tour, or was declined as out-of-title 
work,
Steinberg testified that, although Asamoah was placed at the bottom of the 
seniority list for nonpayment of dues, he was still offered overtime work on several 
occasions from June through September 2011. Asamoah rejected the overtime work he 
was offered because it either was not the type of work he wanted to do or was available 
only on the day shift.
Steinberg maintained that he did not categorically deny Asamoah overtime work 
and that Asamoah never told him he felt he was being prevented from working overtime. 
Steinberg’s testimony was consistent with a series of lists showing available overtime, 
available employees to work it, those who worked, and those who rejected it.3 The lists
show that Asamoah was offered and refused overtime, or failed to respond to being
\
called, on June 27, July 12, 20, August 1, 10, 11, 15, 16, 22, 24, and September 6. The 
documents also demonstrate that overtime was available on other dates when 
Asamoah’s name was next on the list for the opportunity, but that he was neither offered 
the work nor charged with a refusal on the basis that he was not qualified for those
3 MaBSTOA’s Exhibit 1 (A-C).
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assignments.
DISCUSSION
In its exceptions, the TWU raises essentially two distinct issues. The TWU
argues first that its rule or practice that members who are not in good standing for
failure to pay dues be placed at the bottom of the seniority list which the TWU maintains
for the employer is an internal union affair outside of our jurisdiction. Second, the TWU
argues that even if the application of this rule or practice falls within our purview, the
ALJ erred in finding the practice a perse violation, and not dismissing the charge in
view of the evidence that Asamoah rejected proffered opportunities to work overtime.
We “have repeatedly refused to entertain complaints about internal union
discipline or other internal affairs which neither affect an employee’s terms and
conditions of employment nor violate any fundamental purposes of the Act.”4 However,
we have also long acknowledged the
distinction between actions taken by an employee organization to 
discipline a member, and action taken against that member as an 
employee which would have an adverse effect upon the terms and 
conditions of his employment or upon the nature of the 
representation afforded him.5
Although the TWU did not include legal argument in its exceptions, it argued 
before the ALJ that our decisions in Captains Endowment Association (Mallory f  and 
Council of Supervisors and Administrators (Marstonfestablish that “[rjequiring members
4 Civil Service EmplAssn (Liebler), 17 PERB jf 3072, at 3110 (1984).
5 Civil Service EmplAssn (Bogack), 9 PERB 1J3064, at 3110 (1976).
6 15 PERB U 3019 (1982).
7 17 PERB U 3002 (1984).
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to pay back dues is not itself a violation of the Act.”8 In Marston, although we 
acknowledged that “the enforcement of dues obligations is an internal union matter that 
is not subject to” our jurisdiction, we also found that where such enforcement “conflicts 
with the clear provision of the Taylor Law,” an improper practice claim may be made 
out.9 Likewise, in Mallory, we found that an employee organization’s conditioning an 
employee’s return to membership on his paying a fine for his earlier resignation from 
membership constituted an improper penalty for the exercise of the right, protected by § 
202 of the Act, to “refrain from joining, or participating in, any employee organization.”
In both cases, we ordered the employee organization to cease from imposing unlawful 
conditions on the return to good standing membership. In sum, our holdings in Mallory 
and Marston establish that denial of good standing membership status can, under 
certain circumstances, constitute an improper practice subject to our jurisdiction.
Employee seniority is in itself a term and condition of employment, as are the 
procedures to offer overtime and select vacation.10 Here, the TWU determined on 
behalf of MaBSTOA the order in which employees would be offered opportunities to 
work overtime and the order in which they would select vacation, based on seniority. 
Therefore, the TWU’s reduction of Asamoah’s seniority affected his terms and 
conditions of employment, and conditioning his seniority on payment of union dues 
violated the Act. The lack of credible evidence to establish any pecuniary loss resulting
8 Post-Hearing Brief, at 6.
9 17 PERB U 3002, at 3004 (emphasis in original).
10 See, e.g., City of New York v Patrolmen's Benev Assn of City of New York, Inc.-, 231 
AD2d 422, 423, 29 PERB U 7015 (1st Dept 1996) (seniority); City of Peekskill, 35 PERB 
Tj 3016 (2002) (overtime assignment procedures); City of Watertown, 47 PERB 3015 
(2014) (vacation selection procedures).
-5-
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from the violation goes to the remedy to be ordered, and does not establish that no 
violation occurred.11 Accordingly, we find that TWU violated §209-a.2 (a) of the Act 
when it altered Asamoah’s seniority standing for nonpayment of dues.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the TWU:
1. forthwith restore Charles Asamoah to his proper placement on the seniority 
list;
2. not alter Charles Asamoah’s placement on the seniority list for nonpayment of 
membership dues; and
3. sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations .
customarily used to post notices to unit employees..
DATED: December 29, 2014 
Albany, New York
0
w *
■' Jerome LefkoWitz, Chairperson
^  Shelia S. Cole^ member
11 Because no cross-exceptions were filed, we leave undisturbed the ALJ’s finding that 
there was no credible evidence that Asamoah was actually denied overtime work due to 
the TWU’s action, and her determination that no monetary “make whole” remedy was 
appropriate on the record before her.
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NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the TWU that it will:
1. Forthwith restore Charles Asamoah to his proper placement on the seniority 
list; and
2. Not alter Charles Asamoah’s placement on the seniority list for^nonpayment of 
membership dues.
Dated B y .................................................................................
On behalf of the Transport Workers Union
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-30589
- and -
NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY,
Respondent.
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, GENERAL COUNSEL
(PAUL S. BAMBERGER of counsel), for Charging Party
CARLOS MILLAN, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS, for Respondent
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State Thruway 
Authority (Authority) to a decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ), finding that the 
Authority violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act).1 
The ALJ found that the Authority failed to satisfy its duty to negotiate with the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) by 
unilaterally altering the long-standing procedures by which CSEA-represented 
employees accounted for their use of Authority-assigned vehicles when such usage 
included both work and commuting to and from work. In its view, the ALJ ordered the 
Authority to refrain from implementing the new work rule, to destroy any logs or records
1 47 PERB U 4502 (2014).
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created pursuant to it, and to expunge any reference in personnel files and/or any other 
employer files regarding any lack of compliance with the new work rule. The ALJ also 
ordered make whole relief, and the posting of a notice.
EXCEPTIONS
The Authority excepts to the ALJ’s decision on four grounds. First, the Authority 
contends that the ALJ erred in finding that the change was not de minimis, and in not 
“giving greater weight to the Authority’s “legitimate business need,” that is, its need “to 
attempt to account for the use of public resources.”2
Second, the Authority asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that, under the past 
practice, the employees did not provide their vehicle mile usage. Conceding that “in 
many instances, the calculated mile usage was not specifically reported,” it nonetheless 
claims that “the facts underlying a mileage calculation have been provided.”3 In view of 
this, the Authority contends that the imposition of the “minimal additional task of writing 
down the vehicle odometer reading” should not constitute an improper practice “when 
balanced against the legitimate managerial obligation to account for the public’s 
equipment.”4
Third, the Authority contends that the ALJ did not give sufficient weight to the 
employee’s obligation to report the value of the benefit of an employer-provided car, 
and IRS advice that employees with such a benefit maintain a log distinguishing the 
personal from the professional use. The ALJ improperly disregarded the fact that the
X
2 Exceptions, at p. 2.
3 Id.
4 Exceptions, at p. 5.
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Authority’s change in policy was for legitimate business purposes.
Finally, the Authority objects to the ALJ’s ordering the expunging and destruction 
of already submitted monthly logs, which constitute a public record appropriately 
maintained for tax purposes.5
CSEA filed a response supporting the ALJ’s decision, in particular noting that the 
third exception was not based on facts or legal contentions raised before the ALJ, and 
that it was therefore not properly before the Board.
FACTS
The relevant facts are not disputed, and are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision.
In sum, the record establishes that, for approximately fifteen years, employees who 
were assigned an Authority-owned vehicle for commuting purposes were not required to 
provide any account of their usage of the vehicle other than a tax form that allowed an 
employee to estimate the value of the total economic benefit of their personal use of the 
vehicle. In 2010, the Authority unilaterally promulgated a new policy requiring that 
employees provide the employer with a monthly log recording each business and 
personal use of the vehicle, providing for each use the specific odometer readings at
5 The Authority also excepted “to each unfavorable ruling on evidence and to each and 
every part of the [ALJ’s] Decision finding that [the Authority] has violated section 209- 
a.1 (d). of the Civil Service Law.” Exceptions, at p. 1. We have previously held that 
“such blunderbuss exceptions do not comport with the Rules [of Procedure],” and do 
not preserve arguments not expressly made in the exceptions. UFT (Pinkard), 47 
PERB^ 3020, at 3061 (2014). Failure to raise specific claims with references to the 
ALJ’s decisions results in the waiver of such claims. Village of Endicott, 47 PERB 
3017, at 3052, n. 5 (2014) (citing § 213.2(b)(4) PERB Rules of Procedure; City of 
Schenectady, 46 PERB If 3025, at 3056, n. 8 (2013), confirmed sub nom. Matter of City 
of Schenectady v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, Index No. 4090/2011 (Sup 
Ct Albany Co July 9, 2014); Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB 3008 (2007), confirmed 
sub nom. Matter of Town of Orangetown v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 40 PERB 
7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); Town of Walkill, 42 PERB 3006 (2009)). .
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the start and end, the start and end times, and the destination and purpose.
The parties stipulated that, out of approximately 600 CSEA unit employees, 
between 100 and 130 are assigned Authority vehicles that they use for work and for 
commuting to and from work. Four witnesses for CSEA testified that, since 
approximately 1994, employees who were assigned a car for commuting purposes had 
not been required to record their specific mileage and vehicle use. The only record 
required of their vehicle usage was an annual tax form entitled “Statement of Taxable 
Use of Authority/Corporation Provided Vehicles.”6 On this form, employees were given 
an option, called “Method A,” which consisted of simply multiplying the “number of 
commuting days” by $3.00 per day for a “total commuting value.”7 Pursuant to the form, 
this method is allowed if the “daily number of round trip miles (rounded to the nearest 
mile) commuting in an Authority/Corporation vehicle to your official workstation is equal 
to or greater than 6 miles” for the annual reporting period.8 The evidence before the 
ALJ established that the employees were not required to record the mileage of the 
vehicle from their various departures and arrivals, nor to record their times of departure 
and arrival.9
In the fall of 2010, the Authority required employees to submit a revised vehicle 
usage form with more detailed information, pursuant to Administrative Services Bulletin
6 Transcript, at p. 23; 30; Joint Exhibit 1.
7Id.
8 Joint Exhibit 1.
9 Transcript, at p. 24.
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2010-6, “Vehicle Usage and Mileage Logging.”10 1Specifically, employees with Authority- 
assigned vehicles were now required to submit a monthly log recording daily business 
use, as well as personal or incidental use, consisting of date, destination and purpose, 
corresponding odometer readings, and trip start/return times:11
The Authority produced evidence that toll plaza managers, who are in CSEA’s 
unit, fill out a daily “tour of duty report,” which documents “what they’re doing for the 
day, when they are going to the toll stations and what they did.”12 Toll plaza managers 
are assigned vehicles for work purposes. They pick up their vehicles at their first 
assigned work station, and return them-to the same location at the end of the day. Toll 
plaza managers are not assigned Authority vehicles for commuting purposes. The “tour 
of duty” reports do not list specific mileage.
The Authority also adduced evidence that all Authority supervisors fill out a daily 
“labor card,” or time card, upon which they record their activities, with corresponding 
codes and hours spent on each activity.13 The data from the labor cards and the “daily 
work plan,” which the maintenance supervisors produce, are then compiled into the 
“Maintenance Management System Daily Work Report.”14 These reports, also 
compiled by maintenance supervisors, identify employees and their corresponding
10 Transcript, at p. 25; Joint Exhibit 2.
11 Joint Exhibit 2.
12 Transcript, at p. 47; Respondent’s Exhibit 7.
13 Transcript, at p. 53; Respondent’s Exhibit 2.
14 Respondent’s Exhibit 8.
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activities, with number of hours spent on each, activity.15 However, these reports do not 
indicate use of Authority vehicles or mileage.
DISCUSSION
In Chenango Forks Central School District, we reaffirmed what we described as:
our most authoritative statement regarding the applicable test for the 
establishment of a binding past practice: the practice was 
unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time 
sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable 
expectation among the affected unit employees that the practice 
would continue.16
Here, the evidence established that the practice was unequivocal and 
continuously in effect such that employees who were assigned cars for commutation 
purposes had a reasonable expectation that the practice would continue. No exception 
was made by the Authority to this finding. Rather, the Authority contends that under the 
circumstances presented we should find the subject of the change—the reporting 
procedures—to be non-mandatory or, in the alternative, de minimis. We find neither 
argument persuasive.
Over twenty years ago, we noted that “it is well settled that the unilateral 
delegation to unit employees of the responsibility for employer recordkeeping violates
15/d.
16 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB ^3012 (2007), remanded, 42 PERB 1J4527 
(2009), affd, 43 PERB 1J3017 (2010), confirmed sub nom. Chenango Forks Cent Sch 
Dist v New York State Pub Emp Rel Bd, 95 AD3d 1479, 45 PERB 1J7006 (3d Dept 
2012), affd, 21 NY3d 255, 46 PERB |f7008 (2013) (discussing and quoting County of 
Nassau, 24 PERB 3029, at 3058 (1991); quotation and editing marks omitted).
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the Act.”17 Such remains the case today.18 The Authority’s primary contention that the 
subject should be deemed non-mandatory is that the “the legitimate managerial 
obligation to account for the public’s equipment” should be deemed non-mandatory 
when balanced against the “minimal additional task of writing down the vehicle 
odometer reading.” However, this claim incorrectly assumes that because that 
management’s goal is motivated by a legitimate business reason, the subject is 
somehow removed from the duty under the Act to negotiate.“over all ‘terms and 
conditions of employment.’”19 Rather, while the “desire to save money or increase 
managerial efficiency are legitimate business motives,” such motives “are hot relevant 
to the issue of negotiability.”20
17 City of Schenectady, 26 PERB 3025, at 3041 (1993) (citing Newburgh Enlarged 
City School Dist, 20 PERB If 3053 (1987); Spencerport Cent School Dist, 16 PERB If 
3074 (1983); BOCES I, Suffolk County, 15 PERB If 4622 (1982); County of Nassau, 13 
PERB ^ 4612 (1980), exceptions dismissed, 14 PERB 1f 3014 (1981), affd, County of 
Nassau v PERB, 14 PERB If 7023 (Sup Ct Nassau Co 1981); Hampton Bays School 
Dist., 10 PERB 1f 4596 (1977)).
18 See, e.g., City of Syracuse, 44 PERB |f 3017, at 3065-3066 (2011).
19 New York City Transit Authority v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 19 NY3d 876, 879 
(rejecting claim that Transit Authority’s implementation of more stringent dual 
employment standards to ensure employees were receiving adequate rest periods 
standards was mission-related and, therefore, not subject to collective bargaining); see 
also City of New York v Bd of Collective Bargaining, 1107 AD3d 612,612-613 (1s Dept 
2013) (upholding administrative finding that employer’s unilateral requirement of a 
doctor's “fit for duty” statement following an employee's absence from service on ferry 
for three or more days violated duty to negotiate despite claim that change was 
motivated to enhance safety).
20 City of Poughkeepsie v Newman, 95 AD2d 101, 16 PERB 7021 (3d Dept), app 
dismissed, 60 NY2d 859, 16 PERB If 7027 (1983), leave denied, 62 NY2d 608, 17 
PERB Tf 7009 (1984) (negotiability of transfer of unit work); see also Manhasset Union 
Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ]f 3005, at 3021 (2008), affd as modified as to remedy, 61 
AD23d 1231,42 PERB If 7004 (3d Dept 2009) (history on remand omitted) (same).
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In Newburgh Enlarged City School District, the “change from once-a-day 
recording of attendance to the recording of arrival and departure, and, for those 
employees affected, arrival and departure at lunch time” was found to be a mandatory 
subject.21 In so finding, we acknowledged that, as a function of the employer’s 
“accountability for the expenditure of public funds and for the acts of its employees,” ihe 
maintenance of a record of attendance and presence of its employees “is beyond the 
scope of mandatory negotiations.”22 23We also made clear that “[a]n employer may not, 
however, without agreement of the employees' negotiating representative, require its
oo
employees to participate in the recording process.” We also rejected the employer’s 
claim that “the interests of the employer warrant permitting it to impose unilaterally 
additional recordkeeping responsibilities because there is already some employee 
participation in the recording process.”24 Following Newburgh, and our decisions to the 
same effect, we find that the subject is mandatory 25
S'
21 Newburgh Enlarged City Sch Dist, supra note, 17, 20 PERB 3053, at 3116-3117.
22 Id., at 3117.
23 Id.
24 Id.) see also City of Syracuse, supra note 18, 44 PERB ^ 3107, at 3066; City of 
Schenectady, supra note 17, 26 PERB 3025, at 3042.
25 The Authority’s argument that the value of the personal use of an Authority vehicle 
must be reported by the employees for tax purposes, and Internal Revenue Service 
guidance recommends the keeping of a log, is not properly before us, as out review is 
limited by § 213.2 of the Rules to the record before the ALJ. Rochester Teachers Assn 
(Hirsch), 46 PERB 3035 (2013). Moreover, even if properly before us, the argument 
is unavailing. The negotiability of a unilateral imposition by the employer of a 
recordkeeping requirement upon employees for the use and benefit of the employer is 
entirely separate from the desirability of the employees maintaining such a record for 
their own use.
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Nor do we find the change to be de minimis. The fact that the employer by its 
own efforts could extrapolate a rough calculation of the information sought by cross- 
referencing and comparing the data provided by the employees in different reports does 
not render the new requirement de minimis. By requiring employees to provide 
additional information by taking new steps not previously required, the Authority has 
made a “substantial change to their terms and conditions of employment.”26
Finally, we deny the Authority’s exception to the ALJ’s proposed remedial order. 
Pursuant to § 205.5 (d) of the Act, we have “broad remedial authority to order make- 
whole relief including ordering a party to cease and desist from engaging in an improper 
practice, and to order such affirmative relief that will effectuate the policies of the Act.”27 
Here, we find that the destruction of any logs submitted pursuant to Administrative 
Services Bulletin 2010-6 by employees who are assigned Authority vehicles for work 
and commutation purposes is necessary to restore the status quo ante, and thereby 
provide full relief.28 '
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the ALJ properly found on the record 
before her that the Authority violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally 
required unit employees assigned Authority vehicles for both work and commuting 
purposes to submit the new monthly log pursuant to Administrative Services Bulletin 
2010-6, “Vehicle Usage and Mileage Logging.”
26 City of Syracuse, supra note 18, 44 PERB 3017, at 3066; Newburgh, supra note 
17, 20 PERB ] f 3053, at 3117] Spencerport Central Sch Dist, supra note 17, 16 PERB If 
3074, at 3124-3125 (1983).
27 City of Syracuse, supra note 18, at 3066.
28 See, e.g., City University of New York, 38 PERB If 3011 (2005).
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Accordingly, the Authority is hereby ordered to:
1. Not enforce or implement Administrative Services Bulletin 2010-6, 
“Vehicle Usage and Mileage Logging,” as to unit employees assigned 
Authority vehicles for purposes of work and commutation;
2. Immediately remove and destroy all monthly logs previously submitted 
by such unit employees pursuant to Administrative Services Bulletin 2010- 
6, “Vehicle Usage and Mileage Logging”;
3. Expunge from such unit employees’ personnel files and/or any other 
employer files any reference to or reprimand relating to noncompliance 
with the “Vehicle Usage and Mileage Logging” requirement;
4. Make such unit employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, as 
a result of the “Vehicle Usage and Mileage Logging” requirement, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate; and
5. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations used to communicate
with unit employees, both physically and electronically.
DATED: December 29, 2014 
Albany, New York
J
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
We hereby notify all employees of the New York State Thruway Authority (Authority) 
in the bargaining unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the Authority will:
1. Not enforce or implement Administrative Services Bulletin 2010-6, “Vehicle Usage 
and Mileage Logging,” as to unit employees assigned Authority vehicles for both work 
and commutation purposes (“affected unit employees”);
2. Immediately remove and destroy all monthly logs previously submitted by affected 
unit employees pursuant to Administrative Services Bulletin 2010-6, “Vehicle Usage 
and Mileage Logging”;
3. Expunge from affected unit employees’ personnel files and/or any other employer 
files any reference to or reprimand relating to noncompliance with the “Vehicle Usage 
and Mileage Logging” requirement; and
4. Make affected unit employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, as a result 
of the “Vehicle Usage and Mileage Logging” requirement, with interest at the maximum 
legal rate.
D a t e d . . . . . . . . . .  B y ............ ...............................................
on behalf of NYS Thruway Authority
-.11/-C ase  No. U-30589
This Notice, must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
TOWN OF ULSTER POLICEMEN’S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Charging Party,
-and-
TOWN OF ULSTER,
Respondent.
CASE NO. U-32585
MARILYN BERSON, ESQ., for Charging Party
ROEMER, WALLENS, GOLD & MINEAUX (ANNA E. REMET of counsel), for 
Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Ulster (Town) and 
cross-exceptions filed by the Town of Ulster Policemen’s Benevolent Association, Inc. 
(PBA) to a decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ), finding that the Town violated 
§ 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
recording the disciplinary interview of a civilian dispatcher represented by the PBA.1 
The ALJ ordered that the Town rescind the directive that the disciplinary interview of the 
dispatcher be recorded and any subsequent directives that interviews of unit members 
be recorded. The ALJ further ordered that any references to such interviews be
1 47 PERB U 4504 (2014).
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expunged from the Town’s records, and that any affected unit employees be made 
whole, and a notice be posted.
EXCEPTIONS
The Town excepts to the ALJ’s decision on four grounds. First, it contends that 
the ALJ erred in refusing to distinguish between the “formal” and “informal” disciplinary 
stages, which, under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and the Town’s 
General Operations Manual, are distinct stages carrying separate penalty provisions. 
Second, the Town asserts that the ALJ erred in declining to find that police discipline is 
a prohibited subject of negotiations in the absence of a local law enacted pursuant to 
Town Law § 155. Third, the Town argues that the ALJ erred in finding that taping of the 
disciplinary interview constituted a unilateral change, as the taping did not affect the 
delivery of services by the dispatcher, or require increased participation by her. Finally, 
the Town contends that the ALJ erred in awarding rescission, expungement, and make 
whole relief, as no improper practice could be found on the record before her.
In its cross-exceptions, the PBA asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that the 
record did not indicate whether.the dispatcher was a civilian. The PBA contends that 
the record established that she was a civilian, and, therefore, the public policy 
prohibition of negotiating police discipline found within Town Law § 155 could not apply 
to her. The PBA maintains that the ALJ’s decision was otherwise correctly reasoned.
In response to the cross-exceptions, the Town argues that the dispatcher’s status 
as a civilian or uniformed employee is irrelevant as both fit within the term “members of 
such police department” used in the Town Law. However, the Town acknowledged 
stipulating in another pending improper practice proceeding “that dispatchers are civilian
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employees of the Town’s Police Department” and that “a review of the Record in the 
instant proceeding illustrates that [the dispatcher] is a civilian employee.”2
FACTS
On February 13, 2013, Chief of Police Anthony Cruise notified Dispatcher Stacey 
Hommel that a week later, on February 20, she would be interviewed on a matter 
involving the potential for discipline. On February 20, 2013, Hommel appeared as 
ordered for the interview, accompanied by PBA-provided counsel appearing as its and 
Hommel’s representative. Chief Cruise appeared at the beginning of the interview, 
informed Hommel that the interview would be tape-recorded and directed her to submit 
to the recorded disciplinary interview. Over her counsel’s objection, Hommel complied. 
The Town’s counsel then conducted the interview.3
It is undisputed that prior to the recording of Hommel’s interview, the Town had 
never recorded a PBA member’s disciplinary interview. The parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement describes formal and informal disciplinary stages within the 
Police Department.4 Chief Cruise testified that in the 20 years he had been with the 
Town’s Police Department, there had never been an interview at the “formal stage” of 
discipline.
In May 2013, approximately two months after the Association filed its charge in 
this case, the Town enacted Local Law No. 2, which codified the Town’s procedures for
2 Response to Cross-Exceptions, at 7, n. 9.
3 Respondent’s Exhibit 3.
4 Respondent’s Exhibit 1. The Town presented testimony on the difference between 
them.
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police discipline.5 Cruise testified that Local Law No. 2 did not change the investigative 
procedures in effect prior to its enactment. The new local law does not explicitly 
address the recording of disciplinary interviews.
DISCUSSION
We affirm the ALJ’s ultimate disposition of the case, but for reasons different 
from those upon which she relied. As a threshold matter, we need not resolve the 
exceptions to the ALJ’s conclusion that “[i]n the absence of a local law enacted pursuant 
to Town Law §155 prior to Hommel’s interview, police discipline remained a mandatory 
subject of bargaining.”6 In Town of Wallkill v Civil Service‘Employees Association, Inc., 
the Court of Appeals stated that:
Town Law § 155, a general law enacted prior to Civil Service Law §§
75 and 76, commits to the Town “the power and authority to adopt 
and make rules and regulations for the examination, hearing, 
investigation and determination of charges, made or preferred 
against any member or members of such police department.”
Accordingly, the subject of police discipline resides with the Town 
Board and is a prohibited subject of collective bargaining between 
the Town and Wallkill PBA.7
While the ALJ’s reasoning is based on a very real factual distinction between the 
instant case and Wallkill, the language employed by the Court is, at a minimum, in 
tension with her finding on this point. However, we need not determine authoritatively 
whether the ALJ erred on this point, as, even assuming the Town is correct in this 
exception, we nonetheless find that the prohibition against bargaining over police
5 Respondent’s Exhibit 8.
6 47 PERB jj 4504, at 4513.
7 19 NY3d 1066, 1069 (2012).
Case No. U-32585 - 5 -
discipline in Town Law § 155 does not encompass civilian employees, such as Hommel.
The first section of Article Ten of the Town Law, Town Law § 150.1, which 
provides for the establishment of town police departments, authorizes the appointment 
of “a chief of police and such officers and patrolmen as may be needed...”8 Similarly, § 
151 states that “no person shall be eligible for appointment or reappointment to such 
police department, nor continue as a member thereof who is not a citizen, not literate in 
English, and not a resident of New York State and of the county wherein the employing 
town is situated. Section 151 explicitly refers back to § 150 in its use of “such police 
department,” and therefore the power of appointment at issue is that defined in § 150, 
and the scope of “members” is limited to those appointed pursuant to § 150, that is, to 
“officers and patrolmen.”9
- Section 152 further narrows the scope of the term “members” to uniformed 
employees, by allowing for “promotions of officers and members of such police 
departments on the basis of seniority, meritorious police service and superior capacity 
as shown by competitive examination.” Section 152 also provides that “[individual acts 
of personal bravery may be treated as an element of meritorious police service,” and 
that the town board “shall keep a complete service record of each member of such 
police department” for transmittal to the appropriate civil service commission prior to the 
examination. As used in this section, the phrase “member of such police department”
8 Section 150.2 also provides for the creation of police commissioners.
9 Statutes § 97; see Albany Law School v New York State Office of Mental Retardation 
and Developmental Disabilities, 19 N.Y.3d 106, 120 (2012).
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clearly denotes police officers appointed pursuant to § 150.10 1
Against this backdrop, the use in § 155 of the phrase “any member or members 
of such police department" must be understood to be limited to “officers and 
patrolmen”—that is, to police officers appointed pursuant to Town Law § 150. This 
understanding is, in fact, borne out by the legislative history of § 155.
In 1934, a statute amending § 155 to replace the word “punishment” with 
“conviction” described its purpose as amending the Town Law “in relation to discipline 
and charges against policemen,” a usage consistent with the memoranda in support of 
the amendment.11 Two of the memoranda in support, one submitted on behalf of a 
police union, and another on behalf of the Association of Towns, refer to the employees 
at issue interchangeably as “a member of the Police Department” and as a 
“policeman.”12
Likewise, when § 155 was again amended in 1935 to require the town board to . 
prefer charges within 60 days of becoming aware of the alleged misconduct, the 
amending bill was captioned as a law “in relation to discipline and charges against town
10 While not dispositive, we note that the usage in the Act is consistent with these 
statutes. The term “members” of police departments, as used in §§ 209.2 and 4 to 
delineate the set of employees who are entitled to invoke compulsory interest 
arbitration, has been found to exclude civilian employees. See Village of Southampton, 
16 PERB TJ 3048, 3074 affd sub nom Southampton Village Police Radio Operators 
Assn, Inc. v State of New York Pub Empl Relations Bd 16 PERB ^ 7026, 7037-7038 
(Sup Ct Alb Co 1983) (radio operators not “officers or members” of village police force, 
and thus not entitled to invoke interest arbitration procedures under the Act); Village of 
Potsdam, 16 PERB U 3032, 3050 (1983) (same).
11 1934 NY Laws Ch 664.
12 Memorandum of Support, Policeman’s Benevolent Assn of Westchester Co., Bill
Jacket, L 1934, ch 664, at 3; Memorandum of Support, Towns Assn, Bill Jacket, L 1934, 
ch 664, at 6. -
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policemen.”13 Once again, all the memoranda in support of the bill use the term 
“member” to denote “policemen” or “police officers.”14 Nothing in the text of the bill or in 
the supporting memoranda suggests a broader application.15
Indeed, nothing in Article Ten explicitly contemplates the employment of civilian 
employees, although an informal Attorney General opinion has concluded that “a town 
police department may employ as dispatchers persons who are not police officers of the 
police department.”16 In an earlier opinion, the Attorney General, without precluding 
“the employment of non-police personnel for routine duties,” stated that “a town may not 
employ non-members of its police department to perform desk duty with the police 
department."17 The opinion used the term “members” to denote uniformed employees
13 1935 NY Laws Ch 889.
14 Memorandum of Support, Towns Assn, Bill Jacket, L 1935, ch 889, at 3;
Memorandum of Support, Policeman’s Benevolent Assn of Westchester Co., Bill Jacket, 
L 1934, ch 889, at 5-6; Memorandum of Support, NYS .Dept of Civil Service, Bill Jacket, 
L 1934, ch 889, at 7. 5
15 Similarly, the use of the term “members” in the substantially similar provisions 
governing town police departments in counties with a population of 700,000-1,000,000 
(Unconsolidated Laws, ch. 11) and 160,000-190,000 (Id., ch 12), is limited to uniformed 
personnel. See, e.g., § 5812 (“such other officers and such number of policemen” 
described as “such members of such police force,” who, upon appointment are deemed 
to “be peace officers and . . . have all the powers and be subject to all the liabilities of 
town constables and peace officers. . . ” The canon of construction that, “[ejven if the 
words occur in different statutes, if the acts are similar in intent and character, the same 
meaning may be attached to them,” the term “is understood as having been used in the 
same sense,” applies to reinforce the specific meaning of the term. Statutes § 236; see 
also Albany Law School v New York State Office of Mental Retardation and 
Developmental Disabilities, 19 N.Y.3d at 120-121.
16 1985 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. (Inf.) 138.
17 1970 N.Y. Op. Atty Gen. (Inf.) 120.
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and “civilian employees” as excluded from that term.18
Against these arguments, the Town has adduced only a dictionary definition of 
member, as “a distinct part of a whole” and a “person belonging to a group or 
organization.”19 While resort to dictionaries “may be useful as guide posts in 
determining the sense with which a word was used, where the word or term is not 
defined in the statute and legislative history throws no light on the question of legislative 
intent,”20 such is not the case here. The references in subsequent sections to the 
specific employees comprised within Article Ten of the Town Law in § 150, the explicit 
parallel provisions in substantially similar or related statutes, and the legislative history, 
as well as the consistent construction of the term overtime, do not create the kind of 
record in which resort to a dictionary is warranted. Rather, these factors establish that 
“member of a police department” is a term of art with a specific meaning that excludes 
civilian employees.
Our construction is informed by and consistent with the Court of Appeals’ opinion 
in Town ofWallkill, in which the Court had before it the question of whether two police 
officers, clearly “members of such police department,” were precluded from asserting 
collectively bargained disciplinary rights. The Court found that they were, because “the 
subject of police discipline resides with the Town Board.”21 Throughout the Court’s
18 Id.
19 Response to Cross-Exceptions at 8, quoting Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary, 
Revised Ed. (1996).
20 Statutes § 236.
19 NY3d at 1069.21
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decisions in this regard, it has only found “police discipline” to be precluded where “the 
legislation discloses a legislative intent and public policy to leave the disciplining of 
police officers to the discretion of the Police Commissioner,” and has, in so doing, 
“emphasized the quasi-military nature of a police force.”22 Neither the legislative intent, 
nor the special nature of police officers’ work at issue in those cases is at issue here, 
and therefore we find that the public policy exclusion of police discipline from collective 
bargaining does not apply to civilian employees working in town police departments in 
non-police officer functions.
Having found that the subject of taping the interview was not prohibited, we now 
consider whether it is mandatory as to civilian employees working in town police officers 
and performing non-police officer functions. We find that the taping of the interview was 
a change in procedure, and was mandatorily bargainable. There is no dispute that the
disciplinary interview of Hommel was the first such interview to be recorded, and so no
. ✓
claim can be made that it did not constitute a unilateral change. Rather, the Town 
contends that the taping did not affect terms and conditions of employment relating to a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. We do not find this contention persuasive. . .
We have long held that “employer procedures requiring an employee to 
participate in an investigatory meeting from which the employee is subject 
to discipline are unquestionably mandatory subjects of negotiation.”23 The negotiability
22 Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn of the City of NY, jnc. v NYS Pub Empl Relation Bd, 6 
NY3d 563, 575-576 (2006) (emphasis added).
23 Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch Dist, 30 PERB ^ 3041, at 3094 (1997) (citing 
Auburn Police Local 195vHelsby, 46 NY2d 1034, 12 PERB If 7006 (1979)); see also 
Amherst Police Club, 12 PERB 1j 3071, at 3127-3128 (1979); City of Schenectady, 22 
PERB H 3018 (1989) (affg, 21 PERB U 4605 (1988)).
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of such procedures has been found specifically to encompass the demands concerning 
recording “of any interrogation” of an employee for a disciplinary violation, “either 
mechanically or by a stenographer.”24
The Town contends that the recording of the interview did not constitute a 
change, or was de minimis, as the equivalent of an employer representative taking 
notes. This argument does not comport with our holding in Amherst Police Club, or in 
Nanuet Union Free School District, in which we explained that audio or video recording 
implicates employee interests in a manner that, among other effects, effectively 
increases their participation in the creation of the record.25
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the ALJ properly found on the record 
before her that the Town violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally recording the 
disciplinary interviews of a civilian dispatcher represented by the PBA.
Accordingly, the Town is hereby ordered to:
1. Rescind forthwith the directive that the February 20, 2013 disciplinary interview 
of Stacey Hommel be tape-recorded and, to the extent that said directive applied 
to any subsequent disciplinary interviews of unit employees, that such directive 
be rescinded as to those interviews also;
2. Remove from all records within the Town’s control, references to and/or evidence 
of the tape-recording of such interviews;
24 Amherst Police Club, 12 PERB U 3071 at 3127. This conclusion is consistent with our 
holding in Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB U 3008, affd sub nom Twn of Orangetown v 
NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 40 PERB U 7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007), that video or 
audio taping of a medical examination pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c was 
a mandatory subject of bargaining.
25 45 PERB U 3007, at 3013 (2012).
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3. Make whole Hommel and any other unit employees affected by the directive for 
any loss of wages or benefits caused by the use of said tape-recordings, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate; and
4. Post notice in the form attached at all locations, physical and electronic, used by 
the Town to communicate with unit employees.
DATED: December 29, 2014 
Albany, New York
Shelia S. Colei member
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
We hereby notify all employees of the Town of Ulster (Town) in the bargaining unit 
represented by the Town of Ulster Policemen’s Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) that 
the Town will:
1. Rescind the directive that the February 20, 2013 disciplinary interview of Stacey 
Hommel be tape-recorded and, to the extent that said directive applied to any 
subsequent disciplinary interviews of unit employees, that such directive will be 
rescinded as to those interviews also;
2. Immediately remove and destroy all references to and/or evidence of the tape­
recording of such interviews from all records within the Town’s control;
3. Make whole Hommel and any other unit employees affected by the directive for any 
loss of wages or benefits caused by the use of said tape-recordings, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate.
Dated.............. .. . B y .......... .................... ........
on behalf of Town of Ulster
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
1 )
In the Matter of
ORCHARD PARK SCHOOL RELATED 
PROFESSIONALS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT/NEA,
Charging Party,
- and -
ORCHARD PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
CASE NO. U-32864
ELIZABETH VIGNAUX, for Charging Party
HODGSON RUSS, LLP (JEFFREY F. SWIATEK of counsel),
for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Orchard Park School Related 
Professionals Association, NYSUT, AFT-NEA (Association) to a decision by an 
administrative law judge (ALJ).1 In her decision, the ALJ dismissed the Association’s 
claim that the Orchard Park Central School District (District) violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the 
Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally altered the scheduled 
workweek of custodial employees. The ALJ found that the District satisfied its duty to 
bargain the change, and, accordingly, she dismissed the charge.
EXCEPTIONS
The Association excepts to the ALJ’s finding that § 2.1 of the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement (Agreement) establishes with reasonable clarity that the District 
satisfied its duty to bargain the changes in the custodial employees’ schedule. The
V .
1 47 PERBH4533 (2014).
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Association contends that the overly broad language of § 2:1 is far too general to be 
read as being reasonably clear on the specific term of the employees’ workweek. 
Accordingly, the Association asserts that the ALJ erred in dismissing the charge. 
The District filed a response supporting the ALJ’s decision.
FACTS
The relevant facts are undisputed. Custodial employees, including laborers 
represented by the Association, have historically worked a Monday through Friday 
schedule. Any work performed on Saturday or Sunday would be assigned as needed, 
and paid as overtime. On April 25, 2013, the District’s director of buildings and grounds 
informed a laborer that his scheduled workweek would, from that time on, be Tuesday 
through Saturday.
The Agreement, which covers the term July 1,2010 through June 30, 2013, does 
not contain any language pertaining to the establishment or alteration of employees’ 
schedules.
As relied upon by the parties, the Agreement provides:
Article 1. PERTAINING TO THIS AGREEMENT
Section 1.3 It is the intent of the parties that a term or condition of 
employment expressed in a provision of this Agreement shall prevail 
unless there is an applicable constitution or statute which explicitly 
and definitively prohibits agreement on such a provision. If any 
provision of this Agreement shall be finally determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction to be explicitly and definitively prohibited by an 
applicable constitution or statute, then such provision shall not be 
deemed valid and subsisting except to the extent permitted by law, 
but all other provisions will continue in full force and effect.
Section 1.4 This Agreement is the complete record of all 
commitments between the parties. No other commitment is binding 
between the parties unless it is: (a) dated after the execution date of 
this Agreement and (b) is signed by duly authorized representatives 
of each party.
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Section 1.5 This Agreement may not be waived or amended by 
implication or by any means other than a written and dated 
amendment signed by duly authorized representatives of each party.
Article 2. MANAGEMENT’S RIGHTS
Section 2.1 Agreement Restrictions -  Except as otherwise 
specifically set forth in this Agreement, the District, Board of 
Education, Superintendent, and his/her designated supervisory 
officials shall be solely responsible for the operation and control of 
the District and its personnel and to take whatever action is 
necessary to carry out the mission of the school district providing it 
does not conflict with or violate the term of this Agreement. All terms 
and conditions of employment not covered by this Agreement shall 
continue to be subject to the discretion and control of the District.
Section 2.2 Determination of Mission -  It is the right of the District to 
determine the standards or service to be offered to the students and 
the community. The District has the sole right to determine its 
mission, purposes, objectives and policies. It has the right and 
responsibility to determine the content of curriculum, the programs 
and methods and means and number of personnel to conduct the 
programs and provide support services.
Section 2.3 Reserved Rights -  Selection, recruitment, hiring, 
appraisal, evaluation, training, retention, discipline, promotion, 
assignment, and transfer as well as the direction, deployment and 
utilization of staff are rights reserved to management.
DISCUSSION
Contrary to the Association’s claims, the District pleaded the affirmative defenses 
of both duty satisfaction and waiver.2 The ALJ found the former defense to have been 
established, and therefore did not address the latter. We affirm her dismissal of the 
charge, but for different reasons.
Although they are sometimes confused with one another, the affirmative 
defenses of waiver and duty satisfaction are analytically distinct:
2 Answer, 20-30.
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Waiver concepts suggest that a charging party has surrendered 
something. Although waiver may accurately describe a loss of right, 
such as one relinquished by silence, inaction, or certain other types 
of conduct, the defense as described is not one under which a 
respondent is claiming that the charging party has suffered or should 
be made to suffer a loss of right. Under this particular defense, a 
respondent is claiming affirmatively that it and the charging party 
have already negotiated the subject(s) at issue and have reached an 
agreement as to how the subject(s) is to be treated, at least for the 
duration of the parties’ agreement. By expressing this particular 
defense as duty satisfaction, we give a better recognition to the 
factual circumstances actually giving rise to it and expect to avoid 
the confusion and imprecision in analysis which have sometimes 
been caused by the other noted characterizations of this defense.3
In order to successfully plead the “distinct affirmative defense of duty 
satisfaction, the burden rests with the respondent to plead and prove through 
negotiated terms that are reasonably clear that it satisfied its duty to negotiate a 
particular subject.”4
Duty satisfaction occurs when a specific subject has been negotiated to fruition 
and may be established by contractual terms that either expressly or implicitly 
demonstrate that the parties had reached accord on that specific subject. In State of 
New York (Racing and Wagering Board), we applied “standard principles of contractual 
interpretation” to find that the agreement demonstrated that the parties had reached an 
accord as to the extent to which the State Budget Director’s statutory discretion over 
wages would be constrained under specific circumstances, with the clear implication 
that absent those circumstances, the Budget Director could set the wages as he
3 Dutchess Cmty College, 46 PERB 3009, 3016 (2013) (quoting County of Nassau, 31 
PERB U 3064, 3142 (1998)).
4 Id., citing Shelter Island Union Free Sch Dist, 45 PERB 3032 (2012); Niagara 
Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 42 PERB 3023 (2009); County of Greene and 
Sheriff of Greene County, 42 PERB If 3031 (2009); NYCTA, 41 PERB U 3014 (2008).
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deemed appropriate.5
In contrast to duty satisfaction, waiver involves either the express relinquishment 
of specified rights or the use of language that establishes “a clear, intentional, and 
unmistakable relinquishment of the right to negotiate the particular subject at issue”6 by 
relieving the other party of the duty to negotiate on that subject.
In short, duty satisfaction is found when the duty to negotiate the specific subject 
at issue has been in fact satisfied, while waiver relieves the beneficiary of the specified 
statutory duties, including the duty to negotiate under the Taylor Law.7
We agree with the Association that the language at issue here does not prove 
through negotiated terms that are reasonably clear that the District satisfied its duty to 
negotiate the particular subject of employee work schedules. In the absence of any 
language in the Agreement relating to schedules, or any evidence at all that scheduling 
was discussed in the negotiation process, we cannot find that the record before us . 
establishes the defense of duty satisfaction on the subject.8 Rather, we find that the 
provisions relied upon establish a knowing and intentional relinquishment of the right to
5 45 PERB If 3041 (2012), affd sub nom Kent v. Lefkowitz, 46 PERB If 7006 (Sup Ct 
Albany County 2013), revd other grounds^ 19 A.D.3d 1208, 47 PERB 7003 (3d Dept 
2013). Compare Buff v Village of Manlius, 115 AD3d 1156 (4th Dept 2014) (represented 
employees allowed to sue employer directly when the contract “either expressly allows 
such suits or implicitly does so by excluding the dispute at issue from, or not covering it 
within, the ambit of the contractual dispute resolution procedures”).
6 Dutchess Cmty College, supra n. 3, 46 PERB U 3009, at 3016.
7 City of Cohoes, 31 PERB If 3020, 3043-3044 (1998), affd sub nom. Uniformed 
Firefighters of Cohoes v Cuevas, 32 PERB If 7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), affd 
276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 7019 (3d Dept 2000), leave to appeal denied 96 NY2d 711, 
34 PERB |f 7018 (2001).
8 See County of Erie, 43 PERB If 3016, at 3064 (2010) (citing State of New York-Unified 
Court System, 28 PERB If 3014, at 3039 (1995)).
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negotiate over a specified set of otherwise mandatory subjects for the duration of the 
Agreement. In other words, the Agreement’s provisions establish that the Association 
waived its right to negotiate those subjects not covered by the Agreement.
In Sachem Central School District, we had before us a management rights 
clause that, in almost identical language to the one at issue here, provided that:
i
All terms and conditions of employment not covered by this 
agreement shall continue to be subject to the Board’s control and 
discretion and shall not be the subject of negotiations until the 
commencement of the negotiations for a successor contract to this 
agreement.9
In finding this language to constitute an “intentional relinquishment of both a 
known right with both knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it,” we 
explained:
In most instances in which a waiver is found, it is found on the basis 
of a determination that the specific issue now being unilaterally 
changed by the employer was considered and waived as a subject 
of negotiations by the employee organization. However, if an 
employee organization has the authority to waive its Taylor Law right 
to bargain concerning a specific term and condition of employment, it 
follows that it must also have the authority to waive the right to 
bargain concerning any and all terms and conditions of employment 
not addressed in the collective bargaining agreement. It is.our 
determination that the language at issue in the instant case does 
exactly this.10
Moreover, our reading of similar language as effectuating a waiver was affirmed 
by the Court of Appeals in Professional Staff Congress-City University of New York v 
NYS Public Employment Relations Board, in which the Court found that, “[bjecause the 
provision at issue explicitly refers to ‘terms and conditions of employment’ and is not
9 21 PERB Tf 3021, 3041 (1988).
10 Id. at 3042 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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confined to management prerogatives, it is evident that the clause is more than a 
boilerplate management rights clause.”11 For just this reason, as we explained in 
Sachem,
[w]e distinguish those cases in which general management rights 
and zipper clauses have been found not to give rise to a waiver of 
the right to negotiate a specific term or condition of employment on 
the ground that the language in this case, unlike those, evidences an 
intention to waive the statutory right to bargain mid-contract term.12
Based upon the foregoing, we dismiss the Association’s charge and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
DATED: December 29, 2014
Albany, New York '
Jerome Lefkowitz, Onairperson
Shelia S. Cole, member
11 7 NY3d 458, 466, 39 PERB U 7010, at 7021 (2006) (affg, 37 PERB If 3006 (2004)); 
id. at 7022 (citing Sachem with approval).
12 Supra note 6, 21 PERB 1f 3021, at 3042.
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Lockport (City) to a 
decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ), finding that the City violated § 209-a.1 (d) 
of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally transferring to a 
private company the work of ambulance billing that had been exclusively performed by 
members of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 100, AFSCME-CIO 
(CSEA).1 The ALJ ordered the City to immediately cease and desist from assigning the 
work to nonunit personnel and restore it to the CSEA-represented bargaining unit. The 
ALJ also ordered make whole relief, and the posting of a notice.
EXCEPTIONS
The City excepts to the ALJ’s refusal to adjourn the case for another day for the 
City to produce an unnamed witness who would testify that the current unit member *
47 PERB ^  451.7 (2014).1
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performing the work was endangering the City’s ability to comply with Medicare and 
Medicaid billing requirements. The City further excepted to the ALJ’s commenting on 
the record that “1 think that [the employee performing the work] indicated, by a shake of 
her head, that she hadn’t been in discussions” with the contractor. The City 
characterized this comment as taking unsworn testimony from a non-witness.
FACTS
The parties stipulated that, from at least 1999 through June 2013, CSEA unit 
members performed duties associated with billing for ambulance services provided by 
the City.2 These duties included but were not limited to inputting New York State 
Incident Reports, Pre-Hospital Care Reports, and HIPAA3 release forms into the City 
computer system; obtaining insurance verifications from hospitals; preparing billing and 
health insurance claim forms; mailing out health insurance claim forms; following up on 
denials of payment by health insurance companies; filing appeals of denials of payment 
by health insurance companies; receiving payments for services from health insurance 
companies or individuals; establishing payment plans for individuals; and sending 
accounts to collections.
Unit member Barbara Parker, administrative assistant, performed all of the duties 
listed above for the period 1999 to 2009. During that time, Parker shared these duties 
with at least one other CSEA unit member. From 2009 to June 2013, Parker was the 
only person performing the duties associated with billing for City ambulance services.
2 The City declined to stipulate that the work was exclusive to CSEA’s bargaining unit; 
however, it did not dispute that unit members had performed the work, and did not claim 
in its answer or at the hearing that any nonunit personnel performed the work. The City 
did not plead that the contracting out of the work represented a change in the level of 
service or that there was a change in qualifications.
3 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-101 (1996).
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On April 15, 2013, the City executed an Ambulance Billing Services Agreement 
with MultiMed Billing Services, Inc. (MultiMed), for the performance of ambulance billing 
and collection services for the City. MultiMed began performing ambulance billing and 
collection services for the City on June 5, 2013. On that same day, the City relieved 
Parker of various duties relating to billing, insurance claims, and collections. The City 
now requires Parker to send information from New York State Incident Reports, Pre- 
Hospital Care Reports, and HIPAA release forms to MultiMed.
Victoria Haenle, CSEA unit president, testified on behalf of CSEA and explained 
that toward the end of March 2013, she and unit vice president Dave Miller met with 
Mayor Michael W. Tucker, and were told that he intended to contract for ambulance 
service billing with MultiMed in an effort to obtain increased revenues for the City. 
Haenle testified that she told the Mayor that his decision would have to be negotiated. 
Neither Haenle nor the Mayor considered this meeting, or a follow up conversation after 
the City Council approved the contract with MultiMed, to constitute negotiations.
Tucker testified on behalf of the City. Tucker asserted that he had concerns 
about the ambulance billing, specifically, that “the City was just leaving a lot of revenue 
on the table.”4 In addition, Tucker was concerned about compliance issues but they 
were, according to Tucker, secondary to the revenue concerns. Tucker also testified 
that he was concerned that Parker was not performing the job adequately, although he 
also testified .that he never counseled or disciplined Parker or caused some other City 
administrator to counsel or discipline her.
CSEA objected on the grounds of relevance to Tucker’s testimony that
4Transcript, at p. 31.
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MultiMed’s audit of the City’s billing had brought up compliance issues regarding 
Medicare and Medicaid billing. In overruling the objection, the ALJ stated, “[wjell, I’ll 
hear it. But 1 assume you’re going to call Barb [Parker].”5 As counsel stated that he 
would do so if necessary, the ALJ then added, “I think Barb indicated, by a shake of her 
head, that she hadn’t been in discussions with MultiMed.”6 CSEA did not call Parker as 
a rebuttal witness.
Following Tucker’s testimony, counsel for the City asked to call a witness to 
testify telephonically. The ALJ declined to allow for telephonic testimony on the basis
that her ability to assess credibility would be impaired. Instead, she allowed counsel to
' \
make an offer of proof. Pursuant to the offer of proof, the witness would testify as to the 
Medicaid and Medicare compliance issues. Ruling that such evidence was not relevant, 
the ALJ declined to adjourn the hearing to allow for the calling of the witness.
DISCUSSION
In assessing the negotiablility of the transfer of work to nonunit personnel, it is 
well established that:
Two essential questions must be determined when deciding whether 
the transfer of unit work violates §209-a.1 (d) of the Act: a) was the 
work at-issue exclusively performed by unit employees for a 
sufficient period of time to have become binding; and b) was the 
work assigned to non-unit personnel substantially similar to that 
exclusive unit work. If both these questions are answered in the 
affirmative, we will find a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act unless 
there is a significant change in job qualifications. When there is a 
significant change in job qualifications, however, we must balance , 
the respective interests of the public employer and the unit 
- employees to determine whether §209-a.1 (d) of the Act has been
5 Transcript, at p. 38.
Id.6
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violated.7
The City did not except to the findings that the work had been exclusive to the 
unit prior to the transfer to MultiMed, that no change in job qualifications or in the level 
of services provided had been made, and that the informal discussions between the City 
and CSEA did not constitute bargaining 8 Instead, the City excepts to the ALJ’s refusal 
to adjourn the hearing to another date to allow it to call testimony relating to the 
desirability of the transfer of unit work to MultiMed. However, we have long held, and 
reaffirmed, that “the fiscal or operational wisdom of a decision to subcontract unit work 
is immaterial to the negotiability of the subject.”9 The ALJ correctly ruled that this 
testimony was not relevant to the inquiry before her, and the City’s exception provides 
no basis for a finding that it constituted error, let alone grounds for reversal.
Likewise, the ALJ’s comment regarding Parker’s shaking her head did not factor
7 County of Suffolk, 47 PERB If 3024 at 3069 (2014) quoting Town of Riverhead, 42 
PERB fl3032, at 3119 (2009) (editing marks omitted); see generally Niagara Frontier 
TranspAuth, 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985).
8 Nor did the exceptions include any claim that, other than the evidentiary rulings 
excepted to, the ALJ erred in determining the legal standard to be applied, or in 
applying that standard to the facts as she found them to be. As the Union did not 
specifically urge any exception to these portions of the ALJ’s decision, any such claims 
have been waived, and are not before us. Village ofEndicott, 47 PERB 1f 3017, at 
3052, n. 5 (2014) (citing § 213.2(b)(4) PERB Rules of Procedure; City of Schenectady, 
46 PERB U 3025, at 3056, n. 8 (2013), confirmed sub nom. Matter of City of 
Schenectady v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, Index No. 4090/2011 (Sup Ct 
Albany Co July 9, 2014); Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB 3008 (2007), confirmed sub 
nom. Matter of Town of Orangetown v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 40 PERB If 7008 
(Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); Town ofWalkill, 42 PERB If 3006 (2009)).
9 City of Niagara Falls, 31 PERB U 3085, at 3188 (1998) (citing City of Poughkeepsie v 
Newman, 95 AD2d 101, 16 PERB If 7021 (3d Dept), app dismissed, 60 NY2d 859, 16 
PERB 1f 7027 (1983), leave denied, 62 NY2d 608, 17 PERB If 7009 (1984)); Manhasset 
Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB If 3005, at 3021 (2008), affd as modified as to remedy,
61 AD23d 1231,42 PERB If 7004 (3d Dept 2009) (history on remand omitted) (same).
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in her decision, and addressed only whether Parker would be called as a rebuttal 
witness. As the ALJ’s decision rests upon the undisputed facts establishing the 
elements of the charge, we find no basis for reversal in her seeking to clarify whether a 
witness would be called on rebuttal.
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the ALJ properly found on the record 
before her that the City violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act by assigning the work of 
ambulance service billing to nonunit employees.
Accordingly, the City is hereby ordered to:
1. Immediately cease and desist from assigning the work of billing for City 
ambulance services to nonunit employees and restore that work to 
CSEA’s bargaining unit;
2. Make whole any employees who were affected by the transfer of said 
work for any loss of wages and benefits suffered as a result of such 
transfer, with interest at the prevailing maximum legal rate; and
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations used to communicate
with unit employees, both physically and electronically.
DATED: December 29, 2014 
Albany, New York
/ /  Jerome Lefk6witz^cKairperson 
Shelia S. Cole, member
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NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Lockport in the unit represented by 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the 
City of Lockport:
1. Will not assign the exclusive unit work of ambulance billing to. nonunit 
employees; and
2. Will make whole any employees who were affected by the transfer of 
ambulance billing duties, for any loss of wages and benefits suffered as a 
result of such transfer, with interest at the prevailing maximum rate.
Dated B y .............................................
on behalf of 
City of Lockport
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered,
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
LORRAINE MUNROE,
Charging Party,
CASE NO. U-32534
- and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Respondent.
LORRAINE MUNROE, pro se
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, GENERAL COUNSEL 
(MIGUEL G. ORTIZ of counsel), for Respondent
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
These consolidated cases come to us on exceptions filed by Lorraine Munroe to 
a decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing after a hearing Munroe’s 
amended charge alleging that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) in its representation of her.1 The ALJ found that the credible
r-
evidence did not establish that CSEA’s representation of Munroe at her November 20, 
2012 disciplinary arbitration hearing violated the duty of fair representation by failing to 
raise a claim under § 75 of the Civil Service Law that the discipline was in retaliation for 
Munroe’s filing grievances. Likewise, the ALJ found that the credible evidence did not *
46 PERB fl4529 (2013).1
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support a finding that CSEA’s representation of Munroe at her January 31,2013 
disciplinary charges violated the duty of fair representation on similar grounds.
EXCEPTIONS
Munroe excepts to the ALJ’s decision on several grounds. First, she contends 
that the ALJ’s decision denied Munroe’s constitutional right to equal protection of the 
law. She further alleges that the union representing a named Corrections Officer was 
able to vacate an adverse arbitration decision on behalf of that Corrections Officer. 
Munroe’s second claim is that CSEA breached its duty of fair representation by not 
raising the anti-retaliation provisions of Civil Service Law § 75-b as a defense to the two 
sets of disciplinary charges against her. She further asserts that the ALJ erred in 
accepting CSEA’s framing of her claim as one of discrimination based on her having 
filed litigation against the State, when in fact she was discriminated against for reporting 
unlawful conduct to the commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections 
and Community Supervision (DOCCS). Munroe contends that CSEA “admit[s] I was 
being retaliated against and still let the arbitrators suspend me twice.”
Additionally, Munroe claims that the ALJ erred because CSEA and DOCCS 
conspired to breach the collective bargaining agreement provision entitling Munroe to a 
bonus vacation day upon her attaining seven years of employment with the State. 
Finally, Munroe contends that CSEA failed to redress her complaint that sick days were 
improperly subtracted from her bank.
CSEA and the State filed replies supporting the ALJ’s decision.
FACTS
The facts are fully set out in the ALJ’s decision, and are repeated here only as
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necessary to address the exceptions before us. Munroe was employed by DOCCS in 
the title clerk II from May 2007 until her resignation on May 6, 2013. On September 10, 
2010, she transferred to the Lincoln Correctional Facility (Lincoln Facility).
In May and June 2011, Munroe reported to the Commissioner of DOCCS that, in 
2008, 64 hours of vacation time and 24 hours of sick time had been improperly 
subtracted from her accumulated time balance. Munroe testified that she had filed a 
grievance against the Inspector General of DOCCS for not investigating these 
allegations and that she also instituted lawsuits against the State of New York arising 
out of the same transactions.
On June 17 and August 11,2011, DOCCS brought disciplinary charges 
against Munroe alleging, among other infractions, a failure to communicate in a 
professional mannerwith supervisors and a failure to follow instructions. DOCCS 
sought a total three month suspension without pay on these charges. After a hearing 
on November 20, 2012, the designated arbitrator issued an opinion and award dated 
November 23, 2012, finding Munroe culpable on some of the charges and imposing a 
penalty of a three week unpaid suspension.
Munroe was represented during the November 20, 2012 arbitration by CSEA 
Labor Relations Specialist Marcia Schiowitz. Munroe testified that, during that hearing, 
Schiowitz stated that it is evident that DOCCS does not want Munroe working for it and 
that the notices of discipline against Munroe are excessive.2 Schiowitz testified that 
Munroe repeatedly claimed that the notices of discipline had been brought in retaliation
2 Transcript, at pp 22, 36.
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for her “lawsuit” and then refused to provide documentation regarding the lawsuit.3 
Linda Boyd, CSEA’s local grievance representative, testified to the same effect as 
Schiowitz.4 Boyd testified that Munroe had never claimed that her grievances had 
precipitated the allegedly retaliatory discipline.5
On January 31,2012, DOCCS issued another notice of discipline 
against Munroe, alleging that she had failed to communicate in a professional manner 
with her supervisor and in addition charging her with insubordination. DOCCS 
sought termination as a penalty. After an arbitration hearing, at which an attorney 
retained by CSEA, Brandi Hawkins, represented Munroe, the arbitrator issued an 
opinion and award dated February 5, 2013, in which he found Munroe culpable of the 
charges and imposed as a penalty suspension without pay for three months.
In preparing for the arbitration hearing, Hawkins requested Munroe to meet with 
her, and Munroe refused. When CSEA informed her that failure to cooperate with 
Hawkins would lead to CSEA’s withdrawing representation, Munroe faxed Hawkins a 
letter stating that she did not believe a meeting was necessaiy. In that letter, Munroe 
also stated that DOCCS was retaliating against her because she “exposed corruption 
and started a lawsuit because DOCCS did nothing to correct my falsified time and 
attendance record.”6 Munroe again refused to provide documentation about the 
lawsuit, and Hawkins warned her that without the information about the lawsuit,
3 Transcript, at pp'54-56, 60-61; CSEA Exhibit 10.
4 Transcript, at pp 72-74, 75-78.
5 Transcript, at.p 80.
6 CSEA Exhibit 12(b).
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Hawkins could not argue it as a basis for retaliation.7
Lisa McNeil, CSEA’s legal assistance program administrator, testified that she 
had communicated with both Hawkins and Munroe during the pendency of the charges, 
and that Hawkins had told her that Munroe had maintained that “the NOD was 
retaliation for the lawsuit she filed.”8 Asked on cross-examination why Munroe’s letter to 
Hawkins identifying exposure of corruption as a basis for retaliation had not led CSEA to 
assert that as a defense, McNeil replied, “[b]ut you only make a statement. You don’t 
actually give her any proof of it, whether it is a lawsuit or anything.”9 She reiterated,
“You just gave her a statement, but you gave her no proof.”10 1
DISCUSSION
To establish a breach of the duty of fair representation under the Act, a charging 
party “has the burden of proof to demonstrate that an employee organization's conduct 
or actions are arbitrary, discriminatory or founded in bad faith.”11 As we recently pointed 
out, the courts have:
reject[ed] the standard . . . that “irresponsible or grossly negligent” 
conduct may form the basis for a union’s breach of 
the duty of fair representation as not within the meaning of improper 
employee organization practices set forth in Civil Service Law § 209- 
a. An honest mistake resulting from misunderstanding or lack of
7 CSEA Exhibit 16.
8 Transcript, at p 101. Hawkins, who had moved to Florida, was not called by either 
party to testify. Id. at 100.
9 Transcript, at p 106.
10 Transcript, at pp 106-107.
11 Bienko (CSEA), 47 PERB U 3027, 3082-3083 (2014), quoting District Council 37, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Farrey), 41 PERB 3027, at 3119 (2008).
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familiarity with matters of procedure does not rise to the level of the 
requisite arbitrary, discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to 
establish an improper practice by the union.12
No evidence of bias, bad faith or discrimination has been adduced to support the 
charge. Indeed, CSEA represented Munroe in two arbitration proceedings, arising out 
of three notices of discipline, and in both instances secured for her results that were 
significantly better than the outcome sought by DOCCS.
Munroe’s sole factual predicate for her claim of unequal treatment is her 
identification of a Corrections Officer whose union successfully sought to vacate an 
arbitrator’s award. However, the record is devoid of any information concerning the 
basis for the vacatur or the underlying facts of that matter. Moreover, as Munroe does 
not even assert that CSEA represented that employee, the allegation has no probative 
value as to any disparate treatment by CSEA of Munroe.13
We have long held that “[i]t is well-settled that an employee organization is
12 Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB 3008, 3026 (2014) (quoting Civ Serv 
EmplAssn, Local 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz), 132 AD 2d 430, 432, 20 
PERB 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB U 
7017(1988)).
13 Although Munroe names the Corrections Officer at issue as “Kawalski,” she appears 
to be referring to Court of Appeals’ decision in Kowaieski v NY State Dept of 
Correctional Svcs, 16 NY3d 85, 89 (2010). In that case, the Court vacated a 
disciplinary arbitration sustaining charges against a Correction Officer who had 
“reported a fellow officer’s misconduct,” as to whom “the arbitrator observed that 
Kowaieski was “the object of animosity and/or harassment” by some of her fellow 
officers, and that the harassment may have originated when CO Kowaieski informed her 
supervisor of the 2002 incident.” Id, at 89, n. 1. Kowaieski is not an apt comparator 
here. In that matter, the misconduct reported was “an alleged incident of inmate abuse” 
on an inmate.. See In re Kowaieski (NYS Dept of Corr Svcs), 30 Misc3d 1228(A), 926 
NYS2d 344 (Sup Ct Alb Co 2007), affd, 61 A D3d 108 (3d Dept 2009), revd 16 NY3d 
85. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals expressly noted, the record was'sufficiently 
developed that the arbitrator found that the reporting of misconduct had in fact led to 
harassment. 16 NY3d at 89, n. 1.
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entitled to a wide range of reasonable discretion in the processing of grievances under 
the Act.”14 In particular, “an employee’s mere disagreement with the tactics utilized 
or dissatisfaction with the quality or extent of representation does not constitute a 
breach of the duty of fair representation.”15 Thus, Munroe’s charge is deficient to the 
extent it rests upon her claim that CSEA “let the arbitrators suspend me twice,” or 
otherwise assumes that the mere fact that CSEA did not obtain the best possible result 
for her establishes of its own weight that it breached its duty of fair representation. Nor 
does the conclusory allegation of collusion without any factual predicate suffice to state 
a claim.16
Munroe’s more specific exceptions do not warrant a different result. Munroe’s 
claim that CSEA erred in seeking to argue that the charges against her were brought in 
retaliation for her filing a lawsuit against the State does not establish that CSEA 
breached the duty of fair representation. At most, the claim states good faith error or 
negligence, which is insufficient to breach the duty of fair representation.17
Moreover, the ALJ credited CSEA’s testimony that Munroe herself persistently 
claimed the charges were precipitated by the lawsuit she filed. Credibility 
determinations by an ALJ are generally entitled to “great weight unless there is objective 
evidence in the record compelling a conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly
14 Amalg Transit Union, Local 1056 (Lefevre), 43 PERB 3027, 3104 (2010).
15 Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (Brockington), 37 PERB 3002, 3006 (2004) 
(quotation marks omitted); Civ Serv Empl Assn (Smulyan), 45 PERB 3008, 3017 
(2012).
16 See, e.g., PEF (Goonewardena), 27 PERB U 3006 (1994).
17 Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, supra n. 12, 47 PERB 3008 at 3026.
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incorrect.”18 Here, as the ALJ correctly pointed out, the only objective evidence is an e- 
mail from Munroe expressly complaining that CSEA might be complicit in “trying to have 
me terminated from State service just because I exercised my right to file a lawsuit.”19 
In sum, not only does the record before us support the ALJ’s finding, but it supports 
CSEA’s defense that it reasonably sought to advance the claim Munroe had herself 
identified.
Likewise, Munroe has not established that CSEA’s failure to fully articulate a 
defense to the charges based on Civil Service Law § 75-b breached its duty of fair 
representation. As we pointed out in our prior decision in this matter, “[t]he Court of 
Appeals has ruled that the failure of an employee organization to present a meritorious 
Civil Service Law § 75-b defense on behalf of a unit member during a disciplinary 
arbitration can form the basis for a duty of fair representation claim.”20 The record does 
not support that CSEA failed to do so here.
An “employee organization is not obligated under the Act to pursue a self­
destructive strategy regarding employment urged by a unit member or to pursue a 
defense in a disciplinary matter, which is devoid of any merit.”21 The record before us 
establishes that Munroe did not provide any evidentiary basis upon which CSEA could
18 Village ofEndicott, 47 PERB 3017, 3051 (2014) (quoting Manhasset Union Free 
Sch Dist, 41 PERB U 3005, 3019 (2008)); see also County of Tioga, 44 PERB 3016, 
3062 (2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB ^ 3020 (2008); see also, City of 
Rochester, 23 PERB U 3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB 3054 
(1979); Captain’s Endowment Assn, 10 PERB U 3034 (1977).
19 CSEA Exhibit 4.
20 CSEA (Munroe), 46 PERB 3013, 3029 (2013).
21 UFT (Hunt), 45 PERB 3038, 3094 (2012).
Case N o . U -3 2 5 3 4 -9 -
causally link the disciplinary charges brought against her to her complaints that her time 
records had been altered. Indeed, no such basis was provided by Munroe even before 
the ALJ. On cross-examination, McNeil expressly pointed out the conclusory nature of 
the claim as a basis upon which CSEA chose not to predicate the retaliation claim on 
the exposure of corruption. Rather, CSEA raised retaliation in the primary context 
Munroe asserted it to CSEA, in the context of a lawsuit. Thus, even if evidence of a 
meritorious defense had been presented, Munroe would have at most asserted “[a]n 
honest mistake resulting from misunderstanding,”22 insufficient to constitute a breach of 
the duty of fair representation.
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Munroe’s charge and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
DATED: December 29, 2014
Albany, New York
22 Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, supra n. 12, 47 PERB If 3008 at 3026; see also CSEA 
(Kandel), 13 PERB If 3049 (1980).
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-and-  CASE NO. U-33631
HYDE LEADERSHIP CHARTER SCHOOL BROOKLYN,
Respondent.
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ. (JENNIFER A. HOGAN of counsel), and 
STROOK & STROOK & LAVAN, LLP (ALAN M. KLINGER of counsel), for 
Charging Party
JACKSON LEWIS PC (THOMAS V. WALSH of counsel), for Respondent
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In the Matter of
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2,
AFT, AFL-CIO,
Charging Party,
-and- CASE NO. U-33669
IMAGINE ME CHARTER SCHOOL,
Respondent.
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ. (MICHAEL J. DELPIANO of counsel), and 
STROOK & STROOK & LAVAN, LLP (ALAN M. KLINGER of counsel), for 
Charging Party
BOND SCHOENECK & KING (RICHARD G. KASS of counsel), for 
Respondent
In the Matter of
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2,
AFT, AFL-CIO,
Charging Party,
-and-  CASE NO. C-6249
NEW DAWN CHARTER SCHOOL,
Respondent.
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ. (MICHAEL J. DELPIANO of counsel), and 
STROOK & STROOK & LAVAN, LLP (ALAN M. KLINGER of counsel), for 
Charging Party
BOND SCHOENECK & KING (RICHARD G. KASS of counsel), for 
Respondent
In the Matter of
RIVERHEAD CHARTER SCHOOL EMPLOYEE’S 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO, 
NYSUT LOCAL #22170,
Charging Party,.
- and - CASE NO. U-33722
RIVERHEAD CHARTER SCHOOL,
Respondent.
TAMMY MAYS, for Charging Party
LAMB & BARNOSKY, LLP (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN of counsel), for 
Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
These cases come to us on motions pursuant to §§ 213.2 (b) and 212.4 (h) of 
our Rules of Procedure (Rules) for leave to file exceptions to the Board challenging pre- 
hearing rulings of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation
,4 L J
(Director) and of,administrative laW judges (ALJs), conditionally dismissing the above- 
captioned proceedings. For the reasons given in our recent decision in New Visions 
Charter High School for the Humanities,1 we grant the motions, deny the exceptions, 
and affirm the conditional dismissal of these matters, with leave to re-open the cases 
upon further administrative or judicial decisions resolving the issue of our jurisdiction 
over the employers at issue.
1 47 PERB 3023 (2014).
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As we explained in New Visions:
On May 28, 2014, a regional director of the NLRB found that a 
charter school created pursuant to the Charter Schools Act was “not 
exempt as a ‘political subdivision’ within the meaning o f the NLRA, 
and that “the NLRB has jurisdiction over the Employer in this case.”2 
In so ruling, the Regional Director opined that “[t]he Board would find 
it ‘not controlling’ at best and ‘immaterial’ at worst, that the New York 
legislature intended charter schools to be public schools in many 
respects, including specifically being subject to the state's Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act.”3 On August 6, 2014, the NLRB 
granted review of the Regional Director’s decision.
However, as we noted in Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School, and 
consistent with the Appellate Division’s finding in Buffalo United 
Charter School, the “NLRB and the federal courts have ultimate 
authority over issues of preemption.”4
As of the present writing, the NLRB has not yet decided the issue in Hyde 
Leadership Charter School-Brooklyn. Accordingly, “[a]s the NLRB is in the process of 
exercising its primary jurisdiction to determine the question of preemption, we find that 
the [Director and ALJs] did not err in conditionally dismissing the instant petition subject 
to the outcome of such determination.”5
2 Hyde Leadership Charter School-Brooklyn,^ -P E R B-if-GO01, at 8010 (2014).
3 Id. at 8009 (quoting Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter School, Inc., 
359 NLRB No. 41 (2012); The Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School (Case 06-RC- 
120811,2014 WL 1390806 (April 9, 2014)(unpublished opinion denying review)).
4 New Visions, supra note 1, ^7-PERB-^-3023, at 3067 (citing Brooklyn Excelsior 
Charter School,44 PERB1J3001, at 3019 (2011) (subsequent history omitted), and 
Buffalo United Charter School v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 107 AD3d 1437, 1437- 
1438, 46 PERB 7009 (4th Dept 2013), !v denied, 22 NY3d 1082, 47 PERB H 7001 
(2014) (citations omitted)).
Id.5
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the above-captioned proceedings must be
and hereby are, conditionally dismissed, with leave to re-open the cases upon further
administrative or judicial decisions resolving the issue of our jurisdiction over the
employers at issue.
DATED: December 29, 2014
Albany, New York
Shelia S. Cole, rhember
